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INTRODUCTION 
An overwhelming portion of legislation enacted by the United States Congress is actually 
what might be termed temporary legislation--statutes containing clauses limiting the duration of 
their own validity. In modern legislation, these provisions are often termed “sunset” clauses, 
but for many years they were simply known as “duration” clauses and virtually ignored by 
courts and commentators alike. Even scholars of other arcane elements of legislative process 
tend to skip duration clauses as legally irrelevant, substantively unimportant, or both.  
In form, temporary legislation merely sets a date on which an agency, regulation, or 
statutory scheme will terminate unless affirmative action satisfying the constitutional 
requirements of bicameralism and presentment is taken by the legislature.1 In function 
however, temporary legislation differs systematically from permanent legislation in 
significant ways that implicate core problems of institutional design, inter-temporal 
allocation of political control within the legislature, the ability of concentrated interest both 
to lobby for rents and to have rents extracted from them by legislators, the production and 
aggregation of information and expertise in the policy-making process, and the transaction 
costs of enacting and maintaining public policy. Temporary and permanent laws differ only 
in their respective default rules; but given the magnitude of transaction costs in legislatures, 
the import of that difference is remarkable. Both because temporary legislation constitutes 
so significant a portion of the overall legislative docket and because of the far-reaching 
impact on law and politics, more extensive and nuanced analysis of temporary legislation is 
critical. This Article represents the first systematic attempt to analyze the historical, legal, and 
political implications of temporary legislation.  
Temporary legislation was a core legislative tool of both colonial legislatures and the 
early Congresses of the United States. Even a casual survey of historical statutes reveals a 
steady diet of temporary legislation in contexts as varied as the legislative veto, bankruptcy 
law, terrorism policy, and the independent counsel statute, to name only a few prominent 
examples. Against this historical backdrop, it is something of a puzzle that we have so few 
positive accounts of why legislators do or even might rely on temporary legislation. To fill 
this void, I emphasize the distributive and informational advantages of using temporary 
rather than permanent enactments; that is, I suggest the answer is part politics and part 
policy. For example, temporary legislation advantages the Legislature relative to the 
Executive, and allocates agenda control and decision-making authority between current and 
future period majorities in Congress. Yet, these broad effects are not necessarily uniform, 
and legislative judgments about when to use temporary measures are inevitably products of 
ambiguous estimates of political dynamics in the future. From an informational perspective, 
temporary legislation provides concrete advantages over its permanent cousin by specifying 
windows of opportunity for policy-makers to incorporate a greater quantity and quality of 
information into legislative judgments. By redistributing the decision costs of producing 
legislation, temporary measures also facilitate experimentation and adjustment in public 
policy.   
These last benefits of temporary legislation suggest a significant potential for broader use 
of temporary measures in policy contexts dominated by uncertainty. Because, temporary 
legislation reduces background uncertainty and mitigates certain forms of cognitive bias, it is 
likely to provide far more advantages than drawbacks as a legislative response to newly 
recognized risks. The legislative response to domestic terrorism risk is perhaps the most 
                                                     
1 U.S. Const, art I, sec 7. 
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prominent recent example, and therefore provides a useful case study as to both the benefits 
and pitfalls of temporary measures in the domain of new risk legislation.   
Despite the somewhat controversial status of sunset legislation in the United States 
during the 1970's and early 1980's, for most of American history, temporary legislation has 
been a readily accepted and even embraced legislative tool.2 More recently however, 
controversial temporary statutes have given temporary legislation something of a black-eye 
in the media,3 but these high profile pieces of legislation are a comparatively small part of the 
temporary legislation story. On balance, the historical, analytic, and empirical evidence in this 
Article counsels that temporary legislation has a potential political dark-side, but within 
certain well-specified policy domains, temporary legislation should be embraced as the rule 
rather eschewed even as an exception.    
 The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a historical sketch of  temporary 
legislation, emphasizing the significant heterogeneity in the use of  temporary measures. Part 
II turns from description to positive analysis by focusing on the political and informational 
impact of  legislation that expires automatically. Part III turns from theory to empirics, using 
legislation enacted in the aftermath of  September 11, as a case study in the use of  temporary 
measures to respond to newly recognized risks. A brief  conclusion follows.   
 
I. A HISTORY OF TEMPORARY LEGISLATION 
Most discussions of temporary legislation treat it as a relatively rare and modern 
innovation in lawmaking.4 The reality is that temporary legislation has an extensive historical 
pedigree both in the United State and internationally. While not providing a comprehensive 
historical survey of temporary legislation, this illustrates some of the varied uses of 
temporary legislation. On its own, the historical tradition proves little about the normative 
                                                     
2 In recent literature temporary legislation is generally referenced as the constitutionally unproblematic cousin 
of  entrenched legislation. See John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A 
Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003) (arguing certain forms of  legislative entrenchment 
are constitutionally troubling); Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 
YALE L. J. 1665 (2002) (arguing that both sunsets and legislative entrenchment are constitutionally 
unproblematic); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L. J. 491 
(1997).  
3 For example, both the Bush administration's tax cuts and the USA Patriot Act were temporary measures that 
produced extensive controversy, both for their substantive provisions and for their temporary nature. The 
temporary tax cuts were extended, but not made permanent. Debate on renewal of  the USA Patriot Act was 
particularly intense. After a short-term renewal of  three months in late 2005, most of  the provisions were 
finally renewed in March 2007. See USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of  2005 (signed by 
President on March 9, 2005). Roughly contemporaneously, temporary legislation banning certain assault 
weapons was allowed to sunset. Section 110105 of  the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of  
1994, was a sunset provision terminating provisions ten years after the initial enactment. See Pub-L 103-322, 
108 Stat. 1796, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (2004). Despite proposals to amend the sunset provision and make the 
legislation permanent, the statute was allowed to lapse. See A bill to reauthorize the assault weapons ban, and 
other purposes, H.R. 2038, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 8, 2003). 
4 Consider John C. Roberts and Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of  Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner 
and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1808 (2003) (“Sunset provisions that give legislation a definite life span 
usually reflect either a slim majority on a controversial measure, or a solution to a problem that legislators are 
not sure will work.”); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 59 (Harvard 1982) 
(“Some statutes recently passed have had expiration dates written into them. But that is still an occasional 
phenomenon.”); STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 365 (Harvard 1982) (“Congress has 
occasionally inserted sunset provisions into laws creating new regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Energy 
Administration, which was to have expired on June 30, 1976.” (emphasis added). 
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desirability of temporary legislation. However, historical evidence does make two 
contributions to the analysis. First, it helps undermine the notion that temporary legislation 
is a new, peculiar, or particularly suspect legislative tool. Throughout American history 
temporary legislation has played an important role in the legislative docket, and if anything, 
historical documents suggest a bias in favor of temporary legislation. Second, the history of 
temporary legislation provides a basic descriptive backdrop for positive analysis. Even an 
impressionistic reading of the historical evidence demonstrates that legislators rely on 
temporary measures for diverse reasons, ranging from pragmatic to institutional and 
strategic. Thus, the ultimate questions become why legislators rely on temporary legislation 
in certain time periods and policy contexts and how those decisions ought to be normatively 
evaluated. 
 
A. Founding Era 
Temporary legislation was utilized and actively discussed both before, during, and after 
the founding era. In the Federalist Papers “temporary” political concerns tend to be treated 
pejoratively---like factions or majoritarian passions.5 However, temporary legislation was a 
regular component of the legislative process and certainly not inherently objectionable to 
most prominent founders. Indeed, on one view, temporary legislation is a sensible cure for 
temporary passions. The most extensive treatment of temporary legislation in the Federalist 
Papers concerns Article I, section 8, clause 12 of the U.S. Constitution which restricts 
appropriations of funds for the military to two year periods.6 In Federalist 26, Hamilton 
addressed the proposed restriction,7 making two primary arguments in favor of the 
restriction, both turning on the role of the status quo in the legislative process. First, 
Hamilton argued that temporary legislation produces what might be termed deliberative 
benefits. 
The legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this provision, once at least in 
every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; 
                                                     
5 For example, Madison argues in Federalist 10 that the republican form of  government is a partial shield 
against the willingness of  citizens to sacrifice justice on the basis of  “temporary” or “partial” views. Similarly, 
in number 27, Madison draws a parallel between factions and “temporary views.” Speaking of  representatives, 
Madison notes that 
they will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of  faction, and more out of  the reach of  those 
occasional ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently 
contaminate the public councils, beget injustice and oppression of  a part of  the community, and 
engender schemes which, though they gratify a momentary inclination or desire, terminate in general 
distress, dissatisfaction, and disgust. 
Federalist 27 (Madison), THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 174, 175 (Clinton Rossiter, ed.) (Mentor 1961). Hamilton's 
concluding remarks in the Federalist echo Madison's negative vision of  temporary views and temporary 
factions.  
No partial motive, no particular interest, no pride of  opinion, no temporary passion or prejudice, will justify 
to himself, to his country, or to his posterity, an improper election of  the part he is to act. Let him 
beware of  an obstinate adherence to party. 
Federalist 85 (Hamilton), THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, at 520 (Clinton Rossiter, ed.). 
6 U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 12: (“To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of  Money to that Use 
shall be for a longer Term than two Years”). 
7 Federalist 26 (Hamilton), THE FEDERALIST at 168. See also Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 541 (2003) (discussing Founders views of  the restriction to two year appropriations of  
military spending). 
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to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by 
a formal vote in the face of their constituents.8 
Hamilton urged that the appropriations sunset would force legislators to reconsider the 
need for a standing military, and incorporate information about changing circumstances into 
legislative deliberations. Of course, the logic of deliberative benefits extends well beyond the 
context of military appropriations and constitutes one more general justification for 
temporary legislation. Second, and related, Hamilton sought to link the legislative procedures 
entailed in the production of temporary legislation to traditional democratic safeguards.9 
As often as the question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and 
attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition; and if the majority should be 
really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the community will be warned of the 
danger, and will have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it.10 
Because temporary legislation terminates at the sunset without some affirmative 
legislation action, continuing a policy enacted as temporary legislation requires multiple 
stages of legislative process in subsequent time periods. In Hamilton's view, these 
subsequent stages of deliberation and voting provide additional opportunities for opposition 
groups to sound public alarms against unwise policy. Temporary legislation provides both an 
opportunity to incorporate new information into the policy process and a check against the 
continuation of unwise policy, even absent new information. 
Throughout Federalist 26, Hamilton highlights the powerful role of the status quo in 
legislative process, drawing an implicit distinction between two substantively identical 
policies, one produced by a series of temporary measures and the other by a single 
permanent enactment.11 For example, a single permanent statute providing for a ten percent 
annual increase in military spending produces the same level of spending as a sequence of 
temporary one year statutes each increasing spending by ten percent. However, Hamilton's 
intuition seems to be that coalitions creating policy contrary to the public interest will be 
more difficult to sustain over time than a one-time coalition creating a permanent statute. 
The assumption is perfectly plausible, but by no means obviously correct, either theoretically 
or empirically. One puzzle is why Hamilton thinks a future legislature is so unlikely to repeal 
legislation that is contrary to the public interest. Hamilton is correct that the repeal of 
permanent legislation is more difficult or costly than allowing legislation to sunset. However, 
Hamilton seems concerned primarily with legislative measures that are clearly inconsistent 
with the public interest. For this class of legislation, it is not clear that repeal is particularly 
unlikely. Moreover, temporary legislation may be easier to enact than permanent legislation 
and/or produce less intensive review and deliberation during the renewal debates. If so, 
temporary legislation could theoretically be more likely to produce ongoing legislation that 
contradicts the public interest. Nonetheless, Hamilton's view constitutes an important early 
fixed point in the debate over temporary legislation, linking the default rule of policy 
                                                     
8 Federalist 26 (Hamilton), THE FEDERALIST PAPERS at 168, 171.  
9 For a helpful discussion of  the information-producing and democracy-triggering features of  congressional 
procedures, see Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of  Congressional Procedure, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 361 (2004).  
10 Federalist 26 (Hamilton), THE FEDERALIST PAPERS at 172.  
11 Federalist 26 (Hamilton), THE FEDERALIST PAPERS at 172 (“An army, so large as seriously to menace those 
liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations; which would suppose, not merely a temporary 
combination between the legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series of  time.”).  
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termination to both information in legislative deliberation and democratic safeguards.12 On 
this view, the democratic pedigree of temporary legislation is at least as strong as permanent 
legislation, and assuming Hamilton is correct, potentially even stronger. 
Outside the constitutional context, temporary legislation was utilized and apparently 
readily accepted in colonial legislatures and the first several Congresses. By the mid 1770's, 
most colonial legislatures had standing committees to report on the renewal of temporary 
laws.13 Indeed, during the Constitutional Convention, Madison argued that laws of 
temporary duration would become the norm in certain circumstances.14 In the first 
Congress, one debate centered on whether the Impost Act should contain a sunset 
provision, with Madison's proposal to include a sunset ultimately winning.15 The terms of the 
debate trace many of the precise issues discussed later in the paper. While some members of 
Congress thought the sunset unnecessary because a future Congress could always repeal the 
statute, Madison argued that a revenue law of unlimited duration offended the notion of 
Republicanism, and Elbridge Gerry argued that an act lacking a sunset would allow the 
President or a single House to block a repeal.16 At least one representative, Thomas Tudor 
Tucker of South Carolina, thought that virtually all statutes should contain sunsets.17 Soon 
thereafter, in President Washington's address to Congress in 1792, he noted simply that 
“[v]arious temporary laws will expire during the present Session. Among these, that which 
regulates trade and intercourse with the Indian Tribes, will merit particular notice.”18 Perhaps 
more controversially, the Sedition Act of 1798 is another example of early temporary 
legislation.19 Of course, these assorted references do not suggest that temporary legislation 
                                                     
12 A second, somewhat less important discussion of  temporary law in the Federalist Papers is contained in the 
responses of  both Hamilton and Madison to concerns that the number of  Representatives in the House would 
be too few in number. They emphasized that the initial allocation was merely a temporary one that would be 
adjusted as populations grew. As Madison notes in Federalist 58, “The number which is to prevail in the first 
instance is declared to be temporary. Its duration is limited to the short term of  three years.” THE FEDERALIST 
PAPERS at 356 (Clinton Rossiter, ed.). In this sense, the initial allocation of  Representatives was something akin 
to a temporary gap-filling measure. See Federalist 55 (Hamilton or Madison), THE FEDERALIST PAPERS at 341, 
343 (“The true question to be decided then is, whether the smallness of  the number, as a temporary regulation, 
be dangerous to the public liberty?”). However, both passages suggest that temporary legislation was 
commonly accepted.  
13 David M. Gold, Rites of  Passage: The Evolution of  the Legislative Process in Ohio, 1799-1937, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 631, 
631-32 (2002) (regularly recurring select committees existed “to report on the renewal of  temporary laws”). For 
overviews of  early legislative process in the United States, see Donald S. Lutz, The Colonial and Early State 
Legislative Process, in INVENTING CONGRESS: ORIGINS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 
49 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon, eds., (1999); Joseph Cooper & Cheryl D. Young, Bill Introduction 
in the Nineteenth Century: A Study of  Institutional Change, 14 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 67, 69 (1989) (evolution of  bill 
introduction in House); RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD 
BEFORE 1825 (1917).  
14 See 2 M. Farrand, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 587 (1911). See also INS v Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919, 954 n. 18 (1983) (discussing Madison's suggestion during 1787 convention that laws of  limited 
duration requiring renewal rather than repeal would avoid problem of  presidential veto of  Congressional 
repeals); Robert W. Ginnane, The Control of  Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 
HARV. L. REV. 569, 587-88 (1953) (discussing brief  debate during Constitutional Convention on the effect of  
Presidential veto on the repeal of  statutes).  
15 See Nelson, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. at 540.  
16 Nelson, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. at 541.  
17 See Nelson, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. at 541 (discussing Tucker's views).  
18 President George Washington, Fourth Annual Message (Nov. 6, 1792), available at 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org.  
19 Act of  July 14, 1798, § 4, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (law to remain valid through March 3, 1801).  
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was necessarily the norm in early American legislatures, but they do clearly show that 
temporary legislation was a readily utilized tool of the early Congresses, whose utilization 
was consonant with the views of prominent founders. 
Indeed, going far beyond acceptance of temporary statutes, at one point Thomas 
Jefferson crafted a normative argument in favor of a temporary or intragenerational 
constitution.20 In an exchange of letters between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, the 
two confronted the desirability of an entire constitution that would sunset at the turn of each 
generation.21 Jefferson argued that no generation had the normative authority to bind 
another generation to its constitution or laws. 
On similar ground it may be proved that no society can make a perpetual 
constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living 
generation.... Every constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires at the end of 
19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force and not of right.22 
On its own terms, Jefferson's defense of a temporary constitution extends beyond the 
constitutional context to any “perpetual law.” Madison's response was mainly a pragmatic 
one, suggesting first that it is difficult to identify the point at which one generation ends and 
another begins, and second that negotiation and lobbying in the transition period would 
bring instability and factionalism. In essence, the powerful benefits of continuity and stability 
would be sacrificed by sunsetting constitutional or legal provisions.23 On the former issue, 
Madison seems clearly correct. On the second issue, Madison is far more vulnerable as 
discussed below. For current purposes however, the existence of the debate is as important 
as its ultimate resolution. The idea of temporary law, even of constitutional magnitude was 
clearly part of the founders' constitutional and legislative vocabulary.24 
 
B. Federal, State, and International Applications 
Beyond the context of the founding, temporary legislation has been used extensively by 
both Federal and state legislatures. To name only a handful of applications, temporary 
                                                     
20 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF 
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 230, 232 (Marvin Meyers, ed.) (1973); see also Michael Klarman, 
What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 163 n. 90 (1998) (discussing Jefferson's notion of  
intra-generational constitution and continuity); ELAINE SPITZ, MAJORITY RULE 92-93 (1984) (same); 
CALABRESI, COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES at 59 (“The American progenitor of  sunset laws was 
no less a titan than Thomas Jefferson, who argued that all statutes and all constitutions should last no longer 
than nineteen years.”). Judge Calabresi also suggests that Justice Hugo Black was a proponent of  some sunset 
laws. Id. at 60.  
21 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), reprinted in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 115-16, 121-22 (P. Ford ed.) (1895); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in THE 
MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 230, 232 (Marvin 
Meyers, ed. ) (1973); see also Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L. 
J. 491 (1997); Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 780 n. 144 (1991); 
Posner and Vermeule, 111 YALE L. J. at 1671 (discussing Madison's view); Klarman, 93 NW. U. L. REV. at 163 
(discussing intragenerational constitution and problem of  continuity).  
22 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), reprinted in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 115-16, 121-22 (P. Ford ed.) (1895); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in THE 
MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 230, 232 (Marvin 
Meyers, ed.) (1973) Nineteen years was the assumed length of  a generation.  
23 See CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES at 59-60.  
24 For a related discussion, see Philip Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of  Social Change, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 239, 263 (1989) (discussing view of  framers that constitution contrasts to “temporary laws”).  
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legislation has been used in immigration policy,25 taxation of life insurance,26 portions of the 
Voting Rights Act,27 agricultural policy,28 judicial rules,29 international trade policy,30 internet 
taxation,31 Congressional responses to judicial decisions,32 bankruptcy law,33 energy policy,34 
telecommunications policy,35 government reform,36 and tax policy.37 A quick search through 
                                                     
25 See Henry Pratt Fairchild, The Immigration Law of  1924, 38 Q. J. ECON. 653 (1924) (discussing use of  
temporary legislation in immigration policy enacted in 1921 and reenacted with virtually no changes to continue 
through 1924 and giving rise to “permanent” legislation in 1924) (temporary measure initially enacted and 
extended gave rise to Immigration Act of  1924 whose production was accompanied by extensive legislative 
debate and consideration); see also Howard Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and the 
Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1151-52, n. 18 (1997) (discussing temporary quota acts). See 
also H.R. Rep. 87-1086 on Pub. L. 87-301, Immigration and Nationality Act--Amendments, 87th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (Aug. 30, 1961) (proposal to make permanent a temporary law (section 4 of  Public Law 85-316, as 
amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1205), relating to nonquota immigrant status for eligible orphans”).  
26 See George E. Lent, A More Permanent Formula for the Taxation of  Insurance, 27 J. INS. 63, 64 (1960) (discussing 
use of  temporary legislation or stop-gap measures in the 1950's for taxation of  life insurance).  
27 See Jennifer Denise Rogers, Miller v. Johnson: The Supreme Court “Remaps” Shaw v. Reno, 56 LA. L. REV. 981, 
986 (1996) (portions of  Voting Rights Act enacted as temporary legislation and other sections permanent).  
28 See Theodore Saloutos, New Deal Agricultural Policy: An Evaluation, 61 J. AM. HIST. 394, 403, (1974) (view that 
Agricultural Adjustment Act was temporary legislation to deal with temporary market conditions); J. Roland 
Pennock, “Responsible Government,” Separated Powers, and Special Interests: Agricultural Subsidies in Britain and America, 
56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 621, 625-26 (1962) (permanent legislation---Agricultural Adjustment Act of  1938--- 
suspended during war and thereafter in favor of  a series of  temporary laws and extenders). See also Pub. L. 87-
521, Soil Bank---Hay---Conservation Reserve Acreage, H.R. Rep. No. 87-1951, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 28, 
1962) (discussing bill to make permanent a temporary law enacted during the previous year authorizing the 
Secretary of  Agriculture to permit hay harvesting on conservation reserve acreage under certain disaster 
conditions).  
29 Wallace Mendelson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter on the Distribution of  Judicial Power in the United States, 2 MIDWEST. J. 
POL. SCI. 40, 47 (1958) (temporary legislation authorizing removal from state court to federal courts suits 
against federal revenue collection); James D. Barnett, The Delegation of  Legislative Power by Congress to the States, 2 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 347, 364 (1908) (process acts of  1789, reenacted in 1792, forms of  writs and execution in 
circuit courts should be same as used in each state) (temporary law).  
30 Tim Matthewson, Jefferson and Haiti, 61 J. SOUTH. HIST. 209, 240 n. 79 (1995) (noting enactment, but not 
renewal, of  temporary law forbidding trade with San Domingo).  
31 See Unanimous Consent Request H.R. 1828, at 148 Cong. Rec. S14160-01, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 6, 
2003) (discussing the “supposedly temporary law” enacted in 1998 and subsequently extended prohibiting 
states from taxing internet access fees).  
32 See L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v Reina: Compromising Sovereignty and the Constitution, 28 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53 (1994) (temporary legislation changing definition of  Indian later made permanent by 
Pub. L. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991)); see also Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of  Quasi-
Constitutional Federal Law: Of  Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 571 (2000) 
(discussing same).  
33 Dan Keating, Good Intentions, Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance Benefits in Bankruptcy, 43 Vand L. Rev. 161, 162-63 
(1990) (temporary law enacted addressing payment of  retiree medical benefits when corporation files for 
bankruptcy; permanent law later enacted as Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of  1988, Pub. L. No 
100-334, 102 Stat. 610, codified as amended at 11 USC § 1114 (1988) (stop gap changed to permanent 
measure).  
34 See Federal Energy Administration Act of  1974, Pub. L. 93-275, §30, 88 Stat. 96, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 10, 
1974) (“The Act shall terminate June 30, 1976.”); The Federal Energy Administration Amendment Act 
Amendments of  1976, Pub. L. 94-385, §112(a), 90 Stat. 1127, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 14, 1976) (“The Act 
shall terminate December 31, 1977.”  
35 Section 11 of  the Communications Act of  1934, as amended, requires the Federal Communications 
Commission to review all of  its regulations applicable to providers of  telecommunications service in every 
even-numbered year, beginning in 1998, to determine whether the regulations are no longer in the public 
interest due to meaningful economic competition between providers of  the service and whether such 
regulations should be repealed or modified. 47 U.S.C. § 4761. Section 202(h) of  the Telecommunications Act 
2006 Temporary Legislation 8 
the Statutes at Large reveals sunset provisions throughout each volume. State legislatures 
have relied equally on temporary legislation both historically and relatively recently, enacting 
temporary legislation to control the payments of colonial rents,38 to regulate of slavery,39 in 
welfare policy,40 in the riot acts,41 tax policy,42 bankruptcy policy,43 physician assisted 
suicide,44 and even policies on allowing cameras in courtrooms.45 
Nor is the use of temporary legislation unique to the United States. Prominent historical 
examples can be found in English history. For example, a political fight between Burke and 
Lord Clare in 1755 concerned the use of temporary legislation on the free importation of 
Irish butter.46 Early statutes governing fraudulent transfers were initially enacted as 
temporary law.47 So too were the original bankruptcy statutes, both in England and in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
of  1996 also requires the Commission to review its broadcast ownership rules biennially as part of  the review 
conducted pursuant to section 11.  
36 For example, Title VI of  the Ethics in Government Act authorized the appointment of  an Independent 
Counsel, but section was temporary law enacted for a five year initial term. See Pub. L. 95-521, Title VI, §598, 
92 Stat. 1873, (Oct. 26, 1978). The provision was reauthorized several times. See, e.g., Independent Counsel 
Reauthorization Act of  1994, Pub. L. 103-270, §2, 108 Stat. 832 (June 30, 1994). The provision was ultimately 
allowed to sunset.  
37 See Pat Jones, New Day May Dawn for Sunset Tax Provisions, 66 TAX NOTES 1587 (1995) (discussing use of  
sunsets in tax legislation and noting renewal process decreases credibility of  lobbyists but maintains steady 
clientele); see also Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of  Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative 
Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 562-63 (1998).  
38 Charles A. Baker, Property Rights in the Provincial System of  Maryland: Proprietary Policy, 2 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 43, 
48-49 (1936) (temporary law enacted in 1717 providing for payments of  quitrents repeatedly reenacted until 
1733 when lower house rejected and failed to reenact thereafter).  
39 See Bernard H. Nelson, Confederate Slave Impressment Legislation, 1861-1865, 31 J. NEGRO. HIST. 392, 397 (1946) 
(South Carolina first enacted temporary legislation allowing for impressment of  slaves during the 1861 
legislative session as compromise prior to enacting permanent legislation allowing impressment in 1864).  
40 See Robert Guhde and Husain Mustafa, Budget Making in Ohio: A Test of  the Process Model, 34 WEST. POL. Q. 
578, 584 (1981) (noting Controlling Board for administering certain state welfare funds originally created by 
temporary law and ultimately made permanent).  
41 See James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of  Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 
U. PA. L. REV. 287, 334-35 (1990) (noting all Riot Act's but Connecticut's were enacted as temporary legislation 
and allowed to expire after terms of  one to three years).  
42 See William G. McLoughlin, Isaac Backus and the Separation of  Church and State in America, 73 AM. HIST. REV. 
1392, 1395 (1968) (tax exemption laws in Massachusetts were temporary requiring renewal every five years 
during 1700's and noting targeted political lobbying over duration of  exemptions for different religious groups 
in 1930's).  
43 Peter J. Coleman, The Insolvent Debtor in Rhode Island 1745-1828, 23 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 413, 414 (1965) (1756 
Act of  General Assembly of  Rhode Island enacting temporary legislation that became basis for system of  
bankruptcy relief).  
44 See George J. Annas, Physician-Assisted Suicide--Michigan's Temporary Solution, 20 OHIO ST. U. L. REV. 562, 564-65 
(1994) (discussing temporary Michigan law governing assisted suicide).  
45 Jay C. Carlisle, An Open Courtroom: Should Cameras Be Permitted in New York State Courts?, 18 PACE L. REV. 297, 
298 (1998) (use of  temporary legislation for experimental period examining use of  cameras in courtrooms in 
New York).  
46 See P.T. Underdown, Edmund Burke, the Commissary of  his Bristol Constituents, 1774-1780, 73 ENGL. HIST. REV. 
252, 254-55 (1958) (discussing political fight between Burke and Lord Clare in 1755 over the renewal of  
temporary legislation regarding free importation of  Irish Butter and salted provisions).  
47 See Douglas C. Michael, The Past and Future of  Kentucky's Fraudulent Transfer and Preference Laws, 86 KY. L. J. 937, 
939 (1998) (1571 Statute of  Elizabeth dealing, in part, with fraudulent transfers originally enacted as a 
temporary law but extended soon after enactment); see 13 Eliz c 5 (1571).  
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United States.48 England had no formal bankruptcy law for several centuries after the 
commercial expansion of the crusades.49 No formal bankruptcy discharge existed until the 
Statute of 4 Anne,50 which contained an explicit sunset, intended to last for only three 
years,51 but which was continued several times before finally being repealed in 1732.52 In the 
United States, the first federal bankruptcy statute was enacted in 1800 and was also 
temporary legislation intended to last only five years.53 The Act was repealed after only three 
years, two years prior to its natural sunset.54 
Even in more recent history, temporary legislation has found extensive use outside the 
United States. Again, just by way of example, temporary legislation has been used to 
formulate duties on oil in El Salvador,55 draft education policy in Italy,56 address agrarian 
disorder in Britain,57 to expel ethnicities from Turkey,58 and for economic adjustment policy 
in Japan.59 Although other examples abound, my point here is merely that both domestically 
and abroad, historically and more recently, temporary legislation is woven into a broad swath 
of law, sometimes for good and sometimes for ill.60 Temporary legislation was never, nor is it 
                                                     
48 See generally Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of  the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR L. J. 325 
(1991) (discussing the historical development of  bankruptcy law discharge).  
49 Tabb, 65 AM. BANKR L. J. at 327.  
50 4 Anne, c 17 (1705).  
51 Tabb, 65 AM. BANKR L. J. at 333.  
52 See Statute of  5 George 2, c. 30 (1732). See also Tabb, 65 AM. BANKR L. J. at 333 n. 47; Jay Cohen, The History 
of  Imprisonment for Debt and its Relation to the Development of  Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEG. HIST. 153, 156 (1982).  
53 Tabb, 65 AM. BANKR L. J. at 345; see also Bankruptcy Act of  1800, ch 19, § 64, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 
1803):  
And be it further enacted, That this act shall continue in force during the term of  five years, and from 
thence to the end of  the next session of  Congress thereafter, and no longer: Provided, that the expiration 
of  this act shall not prevent the complete execution of  any commission which may have been previously 
thereto issued.  
54 An Act To repeal an act entitled “An act to establish a uniform system of  bankruptcy throughout the United 
States,” 2 Stat. 238, ch 6, 8th Cong., 1st Sess. (1803). Apparently, the Act inspired widespread outrage because 
of  its perceived favor of  mercantile over agricultural interests and small dividends paid to creditors, that it was 
repealed prior to the natural sunset. After the Act's repeal, apparently little federal intervention occurred until 
the Bankruptcy Act of  1841, which contained no sunset provision but met same fate of  repeal as the 1800 Act. 
See Tabb, 65 AM. BANKR L. J. at 349-50; Bankruptcy Act of  1841, ch 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed by An Act 
to Repeal the Bankrupt Act, ch 82, 5 Stat. 614, 27th Cong., 3d Sess. (1843); see also Bankruptcy Reform Act of  
1999-S 625, S Rep 106-49 n. 2 (May 11, 1999).  
55 Peter R. Odell, Oil and State in Latin America, 40 INTL. AFFAIRS 659, 664 (1964) (discussing duties on the 
product local oil refiners collected on the basis of  temporary law requiring renewal every 60 days in El 
Salvador).  
56 E.C. Longobardi, Higher Commercial Education in Italy, 35 J. POL. ECON. 39, 80 (1927) (temporary law 
suspending educational employment guarantees).  
57 See Charles Townshend, Martial Law: Legal and Administrative Problems of  Civil Emergency in Britain and the 
Empire, 1800-1940, 25 HISTORICAL J. 167, 168 (1982) (“Special temporary legislation was still repeatedly used 
there, [in 1800's] primarily to deal with agrarian disorder.”).  
58 See Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Historical and Legal Interconnections Between the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish 
Holocaust: From Impunity to Retributive Justice, 23 YALE J. INTL. L. 503, 521 (1998) (discussing use of  temporary 
laws by Turkey expel Armenians).  
59 See Brian Ike, The Japanese Textile Industry: Structural Adjustment and Government Policy, 20 ASIAN SURV. 532, 539 
(1980) (discussing use of  temporary adjustment laws for the Japanese textile industry that were either extended 
or reenacted for twenty years).  
60 Note also that temporary legislation is discussed by prominent political theorists as well. See Martin S. 
Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L. J. 1725, 1765 (1996) (arguing that Montesquieu claimed 
legislative powers entailed power to enact, amend, or abrogate permanent or temporary laws), citing Baron de 
Montesquieu, The Spirit of  the Laws 151 ( Thomas Nugent trans.) (Hafner 1949).  
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now, an infrequently used legislative oddity invoked only in peculiar policy contexts. 
 
C. Temporary Legislation and Sunset Legislation 
Temporary legislation bears a family resemblance---but is not identical to---a generation 
of statutes known as “sunset legislation” enacted by many state legislatures in the 1970's and 
early 1980's.61 Sunset legislation played a major role in the regulatory reform movement of 
the 1970's that was partially spearheaded by Common Cause, and which was highly critical of 
the expanding bureaucracy and the regulatory regimes it administered.62 The first state-level 
sunset legislation was enacted in 1976 and subsequently half the states passed some version 
of sunset legislation.63 
The motivating intuition for this generation of sunset legislation was that periodic review 
of regulatory agencies increases democratic accountability by threatening to terminate 
agencies if they fail the review64 and produces more effective and efficient regulation by 
terminating unneeded agencies and regulations.65 Whether sunset reviews actually increase 
bureaucratic accountability is contestable,66 but it is clear that general sunset legislation fell 
quickly out of favor after the flood of state action in the late 1970's. The statutes imposed 
significant administrative costs both on agencies that were forced to prepare for review and 
                                                     
61 See generally Keith E. Hamm & Roby D. Robertson, Factors Influencing the Adoption of  New Methods of  Legislative 
Oversight in the United States, 6 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 133, 139-40 (1981) (discussing advent of  sunset legislation in the 
United States).  
62 For an overview of  the sunset movement, see Lewis Anthony Davis, Review Procedures and Public Accountability 
in Sunset Legislation: An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 393 (1981); Dan R. Price, Sunset 
Legislation in the United States, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 401 (1978); Bruce Adams, Sunset: Proposal for Accountable 
Government, 28 ADMIN L. REV. 511 (1976). For a discussion in the risk context, consider STEPHEN BREYER, 
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 364-68 (1982) (arguing for a “high noon” variant of  sunset review); see also 
Lloyd N. Cutler, Book Review: Regulatory Mismatch and Its Culture: Regulation and its Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 545 
(1982) (reviewing Breyer's book). The idea of  judicial sunsetting---treatment of  obsolete statutes as common 
law precedents---was also advocated by Calabresi. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF 
STATUTES 59-64 (1982) (discussing sunsets as response to statutory obsolescence); Abner Mikva, Book Review: 
The Shifting Sands of  Legal Topography: A Common Law for the Age of  Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REV. 534, 537-38 (1982) 
(reviewing Calabresi's argument and arguing for greater legislative than judicial responsibility for sunsetting 
statutes).  
63 Sunset provisions debated during this era were of  two major types. First, some statutes contained specific 
sunset clauses that required periodic review in order to continue the legal validity of  a regulatory agency. 
Second, general sunset statutes were proposed that would require review of  all agencies with responsibility for 
a class of  regulation. Senator Kennedy introduced legislation in 1979 that would have set a year-by-year 
sequential schedule for presidential and congressional review of  functional clusters of  agencies, whereby the 
President would send his recommendations to Congress and if  the appropriate congressional committees did 
not act within one year, the proposals would automatically be discharged for a privileged vote on the floor of  
each house. See Cutler, 96 HARV L. REV. at 553.  
64 See James C. Clingermayer, Administrative Innovations as Instruments of  State Legislative Control, 44 WEST. POL. Q. 
389, 392 (1991) (discussing sunset provisions as part of  structure increasing legislative control of  bureaucracy). 
In this sense, sunset legislation was very much a part of  the trend in scholarship criticizing the growth of  
executive agencies and the supposed lack of  legislative oversight or democratic accountability. See, e.g., 
THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 109-10 (W.W. 
Norton 1979); Carl McGowan, Congress, Courts, and Control of  Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1129 (1977).  
65 For a discussion of  these issues, see Mark B. Blickle, The National Sunset Movement, 9 SETON HALL LEG. J. 209 
(1985); William Lyons and Patricia K. Freeman, Sunset Legislation and the Legislative Process in Tennessee, 9 LEG. 
STUD. Q. 1 (1984); CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES at 59-62.  
66 See Lyons and Freeman, 9 LEG. STUD. Q. at 1 (discussing legislative perceptions of  sunsets).  
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on reviewing committees and were perceived to provide uncertain or few benefits.67 At the 
federal level, sunset review was fiercely debated, but never passed in a general review form. 
Properly understood, sunset legislation is merely one subset of the broader class of 
temporary legislation. Both temporary legislation and sunset legislation enact programs for 
finite time periods, but the generation of sunsets enacted in the late 1970's sought to increase 
legislative oversight, bureaucratic responsiveness, and regulatory efficiency. Temporary 
legislation is both a more general and a less inherently ambitious legislative tool. Moreover, 
the sunset legislation movement was extremely bureaucracy centered, emphasizing agency 
drift and regulatory obsolescence for which the stated cure was greater legislative oversight 
and ultimately less regulation. The implicit assumption is that the less democratically 
accountable bureaucracy is consistently up to no good, while the democratically responsive 
legislature seeks ways to control it. Yet, the reality is far more complex and nuanced. 
Temporary legislation is a far more general tool than the sunset legislation movement would 
suggest. Thus, while some portion of the debate over sunset legislation during this time 
period is relevant to the current task, the old debate about sunset legislation is also radically 
under-inclusive because sunset legislation in its 1970's-1980's form represents only one 
subset of the temporary legislative form. 
In summary, the historical survey of temporary legislation underlines two claims. First, 
temporary legislation has been used in a wide variety of contexts, both domestically and 
internationally. The scope of temporary legislation's influence is significant. Second, 
temporary legislation's democratic pedigree is extensive. The legislative form was used 
throughout U.S. history, was discussed and often embraced by the founding generation, and 
was even predicted by Madison to become the norm in legislative enactments. If anything, 
the democratic pedigree is actually stronger than that of permanent legislation. Thus, 
although modern temporary measures have sometimes been met with skepticism, the 
historical record contains no evidence to support a background presumption against 
temporary legislation. 
 
II. CONCEPTUALIZING TEMPORARY LEGISLATION 
Having dispensed with the notion that temporary legislation is a rarely used modern 
legislative oddity, the Article now turns to more conceptual issues. Given the diversity of 
contexts in which temporary legislation was used historically, the question becomes how 
precisely---in theory and in practice---temporary legislation differs from permanent 
legislation. Formally, the two legislative forms differ only in their default rules for program 
continuation. Whereas the default rule for permanent legislation is that the statute's legal 
validity continues in perpetuity, the default rule for temporary legislation is that legal validity 
terminates at the sunset date. Of course, these are merely defaults. Temporary legislation can 
be extended and permanent legislation can be repealed. The key question for this section is 
what effects this change in default rule produces, if any. 
The initial discussion highlights three related implications. First, temporary legislation 
allocates transaction costs differently than permanent legislation. As a result, temporary 
legislation may produce a different (but not unambiguously higher or lower) probability of 
policy continuation or result in legislation with different substantive provisions because 
                                                     
67 See CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES at 62 (“It is little wonder, then, that sunset laws 
have been disappointing in those jurisdictions that have tried them. Only trivial regulations, which one may 
guess, would have been repealed even without the complex sunset structure, have in fact been abolished.”).  
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legislators perceive (accurately or not) temporary and permanent legislation differently. 
Second, temporary legislation produces a different distribution of error costs than 
permanent legislation. In contexts where initial policy judgments are likely to be inaccurate, 
temporary legislation has certain advantages over permanent legislation. In contrast, when 
initial decisions are likely to be correct, the opposite is true. Third, temporary legislation 
allocates decision-making authority inter-temporally within Congress and across branches of 
government. As a result, temporary legislation provides certain advantages to the current 
period legislative majority, but not without significant risks to their legislative program. Put 
differently, the choice between temporary and permanent legislation is a choice about the 
allocation of different types of political costs and risks across branches and over time. 
Before proceeding to the core analysis, I want to make one clarification. Absent any 
probability of repealing a permanent statute or extending a temporary statute, temporary and 
permanent legislation differ only in the stream of benefits they produce (if otherwise 
substantively equivalent). To wit, assume a private or public actor receives some benefit 
from a legislative package. If all the benefits from the legislation are realized immediately or 
within a single time period, then the value of a generic piece of legislation can be represented 
by v  . If the legislation produces identical benefits in future time periods in addition to the 
current time period, and does so with certainty, the current period value of the legislation is 
equal to )(...)()( 2 vvvv nδδδ ++++  where δ  is a discount factor. If the benefits accrue 
with certainty for an infinite period of time, the current period value is represented simply as 
δ−1
v  . When there is neither a probability of repeal nor a probability of extension, temporary 
legislation simply provides a stream of benefits for a discrete time period rather than an 
infinite time period. If all the other characteristics of the legislation are held constant, then 
the value of temporary legislation will be strictly less than the value of otherwise identical 
permanent legislation. In this simple case, how much less depends solely on the length of the 
temporary period and the value of the discount factor.68 As long as interest groups are 
rational, this difference should only manifest as a difference in the current period value of 
legislation. Thus, a first conclusion is if private interests are willing to pay only for the 
anticipated benefits of legislation, then the price of temporary legislation should be lower 
than the price of permanent legislation. One possibility therefore is that temporary 
legislation is less profitable for legislators to produce. However, it could also be that 
legislators can offer a greater volume of temporary legislation and increase overall gains, 
even if the price of a specific piece of legislation falls. A series of short-term legislative deals 
may provide greater aggregate benefits to legislators than a single long-term deal, even if the 
benefit received from each package is lower. Of course, in the real world there is both an 
unknown probability that a permanent statute will be repealed and an unknown probability 
that a temporary statute will be extended, as the historical discussion demonstrates. As a 
result, somewhat more nuanced analysis is required to make any meaningful headway. 
 
A. Transaction Costs 
Temporary and permanent legislation produce different distributions of transaction costs 
in two ways. First, temporary and permanent legislation allocate transaction costs differently 
between the current period legislature and future period legislatures. Second, the two 
                                                     
68 If  temporary legislation is enacted for a relatively long initial time period, the difference in benefits is likely to 
be relatively modest.  
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legislative forms may produce a different overall magnitude of aggregate transaction costs. 
Each of these effects is loosely related to efficiency concerns. For example, if temporary 
legislation entails systematically higher aggregate transaction costs than permanent 
legislation, then temporary legislation would be less normatively attractive from an efficiency 
perspective. However, the more basic conceptual point is that the choice between temporary 
and permanent legislation involves a tradeoff between at least two different types of 
legislative costs, as illustrated below. The higher transaction costs of temporary legislation 
during the sunset year may be partially, if not entirely offset by lower relative transaction 
costs in the time periods prior to the sunset. One commonly held intuition is that temporary 
legislation is more “costly” to produce than permanent legislation because it involves 
multiple periods of legislative action. In reality, there is neither theoretical nor empirical 
evidence to support that claim. The overall cost of producing a given piece of legislation 
consist of initial enactment costs, realized only in time periods when legislation is enacted, and 
maintenance costs, realized in periods after enactment, deriving from efforts to repeal, amend, 
or avoid any changes to legislation. It is true that temporary legislation will involve multiple 
rounds of enactment costs and permanent legislation will not. However, any claim that 
temporary legislation is more costly than permanent legislation must account for variation in 
both types of legislative costs. As the analysis suggests, neither temporary nor permanent 
legislation is inherently more costly for legislators to produce. 
In a world where the costs of legislation are concentrated solely in enactment time 
periods such that maintenance costs are always zero, the only difference between temporary 
and permanent legislation is how enactment costs are structured. Temporary legislation 
involves two rounds of enactment costs---one in the initial time period and one in the sunset 
period---while permanent legislation involves only a single round. If all per period enactment 
costs are identical for temporary and permanent legislation, then the aggregate costs of 
temporary legislation will be greater than the aggregate costs of permanent legislation simply 
because the first period costs are equivalent and reenactment costs of temporary legislation 
are positive. At first glance, the assumption that enactment costs are equal for temporary and 
permanent legislation seems unrealistic. However, both temporary and permanent legislation 
must meet the same procedural requirements specified either by the Constitution or internal 
House and Senates rules. To the extent that a substantial portion of enactment costs consist 
of negotiating veto-gates and procedural hurdles, the enactment costs of both legislative 
forms could actually be quite similar, making the equality assumption somewhat more 
plausible. 
Still, variation in enactment costs is a more plausible assumption, in which case 
temporary legislation's initial enactment costs are almost certainly less than permanent 
legislation's. The allocative effect remains the same: temporary legislation allocates 
enactment costs to the sunset period while permanent legislation concentrates them in the 
initial time period. Any aggregate effect depends on the degree of difference between costs 
in the initial time period, and the factor by which future period costs are discounted. 
Without discounting, temporary legislation is cheaper if the sum of the initial and sunset 
period costs are less than the enactment costs of permanent legislation in the first time 
period. With discounting, temporary legislation is less costly than permanent legislation if the 
sum of initial period enactment costs and discounted future period enactment costs of 
temporary legislation is less than the single period enactment costs of permanent 
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legislation.69 Theoretically therefore, neither permanent nor temporary legislation involves 
inherently higher aggregate transaction costs. If temporary legislation is enacted for a 
relatively short term---e.g., three years---even if temporary legislation's initial enactment costs 
are somewhat lower than permanent legislation's, the discount factor would have to be 
extremely low (discount rate high) to make temporary legislation less costly. Thus, still 
focusing exclusively on enactment costs, when temporary legislation is enacted for short 
initial time periods, it is likely, but not necessarily more costly than permanent legislation. 
That said, while these preliminary observations are intriguing, any meaningful 
comparison has to account for both enactment and maintenance costs. Maintenance costs 
are a fairly general term, picking up all the costs incurred in non-enacting time periods. First, 
from the above discussion, recall that if enactment costs vary, then enactment costs in the 
initial time period will be lower for temporary legislation than for permanent legislation. 
Second, in the sunset time period, permanent legislation's maintenance costs will be less than 
temporary legislation's (re)enactment costs. It is almost always easier to block the repeal of 
legislation than to pass new legislation. As a result, continuing permanent legislation is less 
costly in the sunset year than reauthorizing temporary legislation. Third, in time periods after 
the first sunset term, if temporary legislation is extended in identical form at the sunset, then 
the analysis for years after the first sunset and prior to the second sunset is identical to the 
analysis for years prior to the initial sunset. The important remaining comparison is therefore 
of maintenance costs in years after enactment but prior to the sunset. 
For relatively short-term temporary legislation, the maintenance costs of temporary 
legislation should be less than those of permanent legislation during the initial term. If 
temporary legislation terminates of its own accord after three years, why expend political 
resources to repeal the legislation in the second year? The reenactment can be blocked in the 
sunset year using less political resources than those necessary to repeal the statute early. 
Although the historical record does contain instances where short-term temporary legislation 
was repealed,70 they seem to be relatively rare. For longer-term legislation that is formally 
temporary---e.g., a ten year initial term---the maintenance costs of temporary and permanent 
legislation should be roughly equivalent early in the term. As long as the sunset is 
significantly far in the future, and therefore the time horizon sufficiently distant, affected 
interests should act as though temporary legislation is permanent, and lobby for repeal or 
continuance accordingly. Thus, the difference in maintenance costs between temporary and 
permanent legislation will generally be greatest for very short-term statutes, smallest for very 
long-term statutes, and somewhere in between for statutes with intermediate initial terms. 
Admittedly, the boundary lines between these categories are difficult to draw with any degree 
of rigor. And, the difference will also depend on the factor by which future costs and 
benefits are discounted. Nonetheless, the basic conceptual point remains. The maintenance 
costs of temporary legislation will be less than or equal to the maintenance costs of 
permanent legislation either for short-term legislation or when longer-term legislation 
approaches the sunset year. The maintenance costs of temporary legislation should be 
roughly equivalent to permanent legislation as long as the initial duration is long and the 
                                                     




ke ccc δ+=Temp  where k  is the period of  the sunset/reenactment. The value of  the second term could 
be quite small in current period value terms either if  the discount factor is low or if  the sunset year k  is far in 
the future.  
70 Consider the repeal of  the Bankruptcy Act of  1800 after only three years of  its initial five year term.  
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specific time period in question is far from the sunset. 
Combining the analysis, the net effect on aggregate transaction costs is extremely 
ambiguous, turning on the duration of the initial time period of temporary legislation, the 
discount factor, the difference between initial enactment costs of temporary and permanent 
legislation, and the difference between the reenactment costs of temporary legislation and 
maintenance costs of permanent legislation in the sunset year. On net, it will sometimes be 
the case that temporary legislation is more (or less) costly than permanent legislation, but in 
general, it is not at all clear that either legislative form produces higher aggregate transaction 
costs.71 But my goal here is only to demonstrate that temporary legislation is not obviously 
more costly than permanent legislation. While the analysis does not demonstrate that 
temporary legislation is clearly superior to permanent legislation, it does show that temporary 
legislation is not clearly inferior---at least along the transaction cost dimension. 
All of which is at once painfully detailed and frustratingly sparse on clear normative 
implications. That said, the ambiguity about aggregate costs does not extend to the allocation 
of transaction costs. Temporary legislation increases the costs born by future period 
legislatures in the sunset year, while reducing the maintenance costs born by future 
legislatures in years close to the sunset. These inter-temporal dynamics have important side-
effects for legislators and implicate the allocation of political power and the distribution of 
errors in the formation of public policy. By requiring that future period legislatures reenact 
policy, the current period majority exercises agenda control, transfers decision-costs to the 




Most discussions of temporary legislation or sunset legislation tend to focus on 
terminating unnecessary statutes or regulations and controlling administrative agencies. 
Although I do not want to downplay the importance of interbranch dynamics in temporary 
legislation, I do want to emphasize the informational effects of temporary legislation. As should 
be abundantly clear by now, temporary legislation involves multiple stages of legislative 
action to sustain a particular public policy. This form of “staged decision-making” produces 
three types of informational effects. First, because staged decision procedures facilitate the 
integration of new information into the policy process, they generally increase the probability 
that an optimal public policy will be selected by legislators. Second, when cognitive bias 
distorts either legislative or citizen perceptions of actual probabilities, staged decision 
procedures allow short-term biases to diminish. As a result, in contexts where cognitive bias 
is likely to predominate, a strong presumption in favor of temporary legislation may be 





                                                     
71 Note also that the above discussion focuses on the costs of  obtaining and maintaining legislation. But, the 
analysis could be just as easily focus on the costs of  avoiding and abandoning bad legislation. In that case, the 
analysis is simply the exact opposite of  the earlier discussion. It is easier to get rid of  temporary legislation than 
permanent legislation. But, at least anecdotal evidence indicates it is easier to avoid permanent legislation 
initially than to avoid otherwise equivalent temporary legislation.  
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1. Error Costs 
The first and clearest informational effect of temporary legislation is the reduction of 
error costs when initial policy decisions have a significant probability of being incorrect. 
Staged decision mechanisms provide information at time kt +  that from a Bayesian 
perspective is weakly superior to the information set available when legislation is first 
enacted. If policy outcomes are entirely determined by the available information set, then a 
staged decision procedure, in which the information available in successive stages is superior 
to the initial information set, is more likely to select the optimal policy than a single stage 
enactment. As a result, in policy domains of judgment aggregation, as opposed to preference 
aggregation---where there is a correct decision to be made conditional on the underlying 
state of the world---using temporary legislation instead of permanent legislation increases the 
probability of selecting optimal policy. Put differently, when initial decisions are likely to be 
wrong, staged-decision procedures facilitate the correction of errors, and this is particularly 
likely to be the case in policy contexts dominated by uncertainty. 
This benefit of temporary legislation is straightforward, but it is also subject to a 
significant caveat. If legislative deliberations on temporary legislation are of systematically 
lower quality than deliberations on permanent legislation, then the benefit may be 
undermined. That is, if legislators give scant consideration to temporary measures precisely 
because they are not permanent, then better information may matter little. Even if the 
aggregate quantity and quality of information is superior in staged procedures, legislators 
could still be less likely to effectively utilize the better information. To state the obvious, 
policy outcomes are the result of many non-informational factors. In contexts where policy 
decisions are likely to be correct initially, temporary legislation merely imposes a second 
round of enactment costs simply to maintain the optimal policy,72 provides a ready-made 
opportunity for opponents of the legislation to terminate it, and yields little marginal increase 
in the probability of choosing a correct policy outcome. Thus, along this dimension, the 
value of temporary legislation depends critically on the degree of uncertainty in the legislative 
process. When uncertainty in a policy domain is high, temporary legislation produces 
informational benefits that aid in the selection of optimal policy.73 
 
2. Cognitive Bias 
 A second major informational benefit of temporary legislation is the mitigation of 
certain forms of cognitive bias. In contexts where private citizens or legislators misperceive 
risk, temporary legislation allows long-term policy commitments to be delayed, which will 
allow some but not all forms of cognitive bias to diminish. In recent years, experimental 
economists and cognitive psychologists have highlighted the plethora of cognitive biases that 
can affect the ways in which individuals perceive and make decisions about risk.74 
                                                     
72 But recall the ambiguous effects of  temporary legislation on aggregate transaction costs. See section~.  
73 On the other hand, when the probability of  choosing optimally in the first period is high, entrenchment may 
be an ideal strategy. Where initial decisions have a high probability of  being correct, entrenched legislation 
minimizes long-term decision costs without producing a high error rate. However, when initial decisions may 
be wrong, entrenchment trades optimal policy for low decision costs, or so it would appear.  
74 For an overview, see BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed.) (Cambridge 2000); Christine 
Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 
(1998).  
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Accompanying this line of research in behavioral law and economics75 has been a call to craft 
institutions that compensate for the potential biases that affect decision-making by citizens 
and politicians.76 As a general rule, these prescriptions for governmental reform focus on the 
relative allocation of decision-making responsibility among the branches of government.77 
That is, significant scholarship on risk and institutions simply extends the fight over whether 
the Executive, Judiciary, or Legislature is most capable of avoiding poor decisions and 
creating effective or efficient regulation.78 This Article takes a more intermediate approach to 
institutional design and risk regulation. Less ambitious institutional prescriptions can help 
compensate both for known biases and for strategic challenges in the demand for risk 
regulation. In this capacity, temporary legislation can help compensate for a variety of pitfalls 
in the regulation of risk.79 
New risks in particular often pose distinctive challenges for legislators and policymakers. 
The policy environment is dominated by uncertainty, and both ordinary citizens and experts 
often overestimate and overreact to newly recognized risks.80 The seriousness of risks that 
are readily “available” is often overestimated.81 Availability is a somewhat fluid concept in 
the literature. However, typically, scholars refer to the “availability heuristic,” which involves 
estimating the probability or sometimes seriousness of a risk on the basis of whether it is 
readily available cognitively. If individuals use availability as a heuristic for evaluating risk, 
recently realized risks may produce over-reaction or at least over-estimation of the relevant 
probabilities.82 Risks that conjure vivid images like plane crashes, risks that have recently 
occurred, or risks that are newly recognized by society all tend to be readily available. When 
risks are seen as nonvoluntary or catastrophic, the danger of overestimation is even greater.83 
Because the seriousness of new risks is often overestimated by the public, politicians may 
                                                     
75 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON (Cambridge 2002). In applied contexts, see Mark 
Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of  Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 
(2002); Cass R. Sunstein and Timur Kuran, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999).  
76 Consider Rachlinski and Farina, 87 CORNELL L. REV. at 549; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and 
Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
The Wages of  Risk: A Review of  Dealing with Risk: Why the Public and the Experts Disagree on Environmental Issues, 6 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 673 (1997).  
77 See Rachlinski and Farina, 87 CORNELL L. REV. at 593 (arguing for allocating primary decision-making 
responsibilities in the bureaucracy and relying on Congress rather than the Judiciary for primary oversight and 
review). Indeed, the actual suggestions for reform are sometimes modest. Id. at 591 (“in terms of  optimal 
institutional design, American government has gotten it pretty much right”).  
78 Much of  this work also speaks to Clayton P. Gillette and James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1027 (1990) (arguing that courts have important comparative advantages in dealing with risk relative to 
administrative agencies).  
79 The flavor of  this analysis is very much in keeping with some of  Professor Rachlinski's efforts to link 
analysis of  institutional structure to cognitive biases in the decision-making of  government actors. Consider 
Rachlinski and Farina, 87 CORNELL L. REV. at 549; Rachlinski, 85 CORNELL L. REV. at 739; Rachlinski, 6 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB POL’Y at 637. See also Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischoff  and Sarah Lichtenstein, Regulation of  
Risk: A Psychological Perspective, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Roger Noll, ed.) (Cal. 
1985).  
80 See SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON at 33-35; HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC 
AND THE EXPERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (Chicago 1996). See generally JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, eds.) (Cambridge 1982).  
81 See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COG. 
PSYCH. 207 (1973).  
82 See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Available? Social Influence and Behavioral Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1295 (2003).  
83 See PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (Earthscan 2000); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Choice, 
Values, and Frames (Cambridge 2000); Slovic et al, Regulation of  Risk.  
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face intense pressure to respond with legislation,84 a dynamic often characterized as a biased 
demand for regulation, resulting in legislation or regulation founded on information that is 
preliminary at best and poor quality at worst.85 While political reaction to public pressure is 
understandable, deferring action until more information exists and public pressure is less 
intense could produce more reasonable or at least more reasoned legislation. Professors Noll 
and Krier considered this dynamic more than a decade ago and suggested that procedural 
tools like cumbersome administrative procedures or delegation to the bureaucracy serve as a 
partial guard against the influence of biased demands in the policy process.86 They suggested 
that “[d]etailed regulatory procedures administered by a resource-poor agency thus allow 
politicians to lash themselves to the mast while waiting out the temporary siren calls for 
immediate overreaction....” (internal quotations omitted).87 Noll and Krier highlighted the 
potential for cumbersome procedures to compensate for or avoid biased demands for 
legislation. 
My analysis of temporary legislation suggests a somewhat different prescription. In many 
contexts, politicians are either unable or unwilling to resist public pressure for action. When 
new risks emerge that scare the public, Congress does and perhaps should respond. Thus, 
for a wide range of risks, it may be all but inevitable that politicians will strike when the iron 
is hot. Moreover, deferring action in the short-term is not a globally correct prescription for 
legislators responding to new risks. The demand for legislation could be biased downward 
prior to the realization of a new risk. If citizen demand is typically biased downward, then 
reacting to citizen pressure may produce fewer policy errors than ignoring pleas for action. 
Empirically, it is true that new policy initiatives are often enacted in the immediate aftermath 
of realized or recognized risks.88 However, there is scant evidence as to whether this results 
in systematically good or bad legislation. Unfortunately, the choice is traditionally sketched in 
terms that are too stark: act or bind one's hands. The collection of legislative tools is more 
diverse than this framing suggests. Temporary legislation in this context provides a 
somewhat more pragmatic approach to new risk that is sensitive to potential biases in the 
demand for regulation, while also taking account first, of the political reality faced by 
legislators, and second, the possibility that action is needed and entirely justified. Temporary 
legislation therefore does not de-bias individual beliefs in a way that permanent legislation 
does not. Rather, temporary legislation simply forestalls long-term institutional 
commitments, allowing any overreaction to new risks to diminish. Temporary legislation is 
akin to an institutional compensation mechanism for the effects of biased beliefs rather than 
a tool for eliminating bias from those beliefs.89 All of which suggests a background 
                                                     
84 See Risa Palm, Demand for Disaster Insurance: Residential Coverage, in Paying the Price: The Status and Role of  
Insurance Against Natural Disasters in the United States (Howard Kunreuther and Richard J. Roth Sr., eds.) 
(Joseph Henry 1998); Risa Palm and John Carroll, ILLUSIONS OF SAFETY: CULTURE AND EARTHQUAKE 
HAZARD RESPONSE IN CALIFORNIA AND JAPAN (Westview 1998); HOWARD KUNREUTHER, DISASTER 
INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS (Wiley & Sons 1978).  
85 See Sunstein and Kuran, 51 STAN. L. REV. at 698, 703.  
86 See Roger Noll and James Krier, Some Implications of  Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 
747, 774-75 (1990) (developing prescriptions from research in cognitive psychology for risk policy).  
87 Noll and Krier, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. at 774. The overuse of  this metaphor not withstanding, it remains 
somewhat apt in the context of  risk regulation. For a recent treatment, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: 
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (Cambridge 2000).  
88 In the context of  natural hazard risk, see THOMAS A. BIRKLAND, AFTER DISASTER: AGENDA SETTING, 
PUBLIC POLICY, AND FOCUSING EVENTS (Georgetown 1997).  
89 Sunsets have also been advocated in recent years to avoid regulatory “stickiness” or to force agencies to 
justify ongoing regulations. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Cynthia R. Farina, New Theories of  the Regulatory State: 
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presumption in favor of temporary rather than permanent legislation in policy contexts 
dominated by cognitive bias. 
 
3. Asymmetric Information 
A final informational benefit of temporary legislation and staged decision procedures is 
the improvement of incentives for accurate information revelation when asymmetric 
information dominates relations between legislators and private interests. While legislators 
have access to information and expertise in many policy areas, in certain contexts private 
interests lobbying for or against legislation/regulation have better information than 
legislators, and face incentives to conceal information that is detrimental to their political 
interests. Under these circumstances, temporary legislation should create stronger incentives 
for accurate information revelation because staged decision procedures ensure repeated 
interaction between affected interests and legislators. When interactions are repeated, the 
failure to accurately reveal information in earlier time periods can be sanctioned by 
legislators. This logic is consistent with models from political science that suggest repeated 
interactions between lobbyists and legislators generally ensure honest claims by lobbyists. An 
admittedly superficial but nonetheless useful view is that permanent legislation entails 
discrete one-time interactions, whereas temporary legislation entails repeated interactions. 
The real world is more complicated of course, but there is no question that temporary 
legislation produces repeated interaction in a way that permanent legislation does not 
necessarily entail. The magnitude of this benefit will therefore be greatest in policy areas 
where legislator-lobbyist interactions would otherwise be discrete. 
Additionally, note that staged decision procedures are utilized as compensation 
mechanisms for conditions of uncertainty in many other fields. For example, in venture 
capital markets where investment decisions regarding new technologies are often made 
under conditions of extreme uncertainty and asymmetric information, staged financing is a 
common tool.90 Roughly speaking, staged financing gives investors an option to abandon the 
project at pre-specified time periods which, in turn, triggers the revelation of certain 
information and aligns the incentives of the entrepreneur with those of the investors by 
creating performance penalties. Of course, staged financing and temporary legislation are 
clearly not identical tools. The point is simply that staged decision procedures are also a 
relatively common mechanism for responding to informational challenges in the private 
sector.91 
                                                                                                                                                              
Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 605 (2002); Robert W. Hahn, 
Achieving Real Regulatory Reform, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 143, 156.  
90 My thanks to Curtis Milhaupt for suggesting this example. For a useful treatment of  this contracting form in 
the context of  venture capital markets, see Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the 
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003) (discussing staged procedures as a response to the 
challenges of  uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs in venture capital markets). The three 
central problems of  financial contracts---uncertainty, information asymmetry, and opportunism in the form of  
agency costs---are each present in extreme forms in the venture capital context. Id at 1076. For example, 
because the portfolio company tends to be at an early stage of  development and the quality of  managerial 
decision making is relatively unknown, uncertainty about future performance is exacerbated. Id at 1076-77.  
91 A similar parallel argument might be derived from revocable lines of  credit in bank financing. See George G. 
Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of  Venture Capital, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 306 (2001). There are, of  
course, differences between staged financing in the venture capital context and temporary legislation. One key 
difference is that the use of  bench-marking and milestones might be more difficult to specify for legislators ex 
ante. Therefore, the staged process in venture capital contracts may provide more specific information than in 
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4. Technocratic Applications 
Having surveyed the informational benefits of temporary legislation in theory, I now 
turn to a more targeted discussion of technocratic applications that make use of these 
benefits in practice. As discussed throughout the paper, temporary legislation produces 
strategic or political benefits for legislators and private interests. However, at least some of 
the time, the motivation for adopting temporary measures appears to be more benign. 
Indeed, temporary statutes are often an appropriate match to specific policy challenges. 
These uses of temporary legislation are what might be termed pragmatic or technocratic, and 
manifest in at least three contexts. Temporary legislation can be used to fill gaps in existing 
law, as a symmetric response to policy problems that are themselves perceived to be 
temporary, or as experimental or information-producing legislation. 
First, temporary legislation is sometimes used to fill gaps in existing law or as place-
holder legislation that is enacted to cover interim time periods while the legislature considers 
permanent legislation. For example, in the late 1980's Congress enacted temporary legislation 
targeting the payment of retiree medical benefits by corporations that had filed for 
bankruptcy.92 The “stop-gap” measure was ostensibly enacted so that some legislation was in 
force while Congress deliberated on a long-term policy solution.93 Stop-gap legislation does 
just that---plugs up holes in existing statutory schemes on a short-term basis on the 
assumption that a more permanent policy judgment will be made soon thereafter.94 
Temporary regulations or interim rules are often used for similar reasons by administrative 
agencies. Agencies sometimes issue temporary regulations and proposed regulations 
simultaneously. The temporary regulations take force immediately while the proposed 
regulations proceed through ordinary notice and comment procedures, which avoids the 
pitfalls of retroactive rulemaking.95 Many temporary tax regulations are said to be 
“interpretive rules” and therefore exempt from the notice and comment requirements of the 
APA.96 Similarly, agencies often issue interim rules after formal rules have been vacated by 
courts. While some commentators have argued that temporary regulations should have a 
                                                                                                                                                              
most temporary legislation contexts. However, for an innovative discussion of  bench-marking and milestones 
in the context of  government and democratic theory, see Michael C. Dorf  and Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of  
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM L. REV. 267 (1998).  
92 See Dan Keating, Good Intentions, Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance Benefits in Bankruptcy, 43 VAND. L. REV. 161, 
162-63 (1990) (temporary law enacted addressing payment of  retiree medical benefits when corporation files 
for bankruptcy) (stop gap changed to permanent measure).  
93 Id at 162. Ultimately, the temporary legislation was made permanent. See Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy 
Protection Act of  1988, Pub. L. No 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (codified as amended at 11 USC § 1114 (1988)).  
94 See, e.g., changes to guidelines for officer promotion and retirement in the U.S. Coast Guard, Pub. L. 88-130, 
S Rep No 88-476, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 30, 1963) (“This portion of  the bill would be temporary law 
effective for 3 years, by which time, it is predicted, the permanent promotion system will be able to operate 
effectively by itself  to control the flow of  promotions.”). See Pub. L. 88-130, 77 Stat. 174, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(Sept. 24, 1963).  
95 See generally Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988).  
96 See Thomas M. Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules With the Force of  Law: The Original Convention, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 573 (2002) (discussing temporary tax rules as interpretive rulemaking). See also Marshall 
J. Berger, Book Review: Defining Administrative Law--A Review of  An Introduction to Administrative Justice in the United 
States by Peter L. Strauss, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 268, 273-74 (1991) (noting temporary tax regulations generally 
qualify as interpretive rules). See also John F. Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of  Treasury 
Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 69-70 (2003) (noting no taxpayer has 
successfully challenged temporary tax regulations on the grounds that the regulations failed to satisfy notice 
and comment requirements in the APA).  
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lesser status and receive less deference from the courts,97 most courts give temporary 
regulations full legal status and due deference.98 Thus, in both the legislative and regulatory 
contexts, temporary measures are sometimes simple tools for policy-makers. 
Second, temporary legislation is sometimes enacted to respond to social problems that 
are themselves believed to be temporary. For example, New Deal agricultural policy was 
temporary legislation enacted as a symmetric response to what legislators believed to be 
short-term market conditions.99 Legislation addressing capacity shortfalls in the market for 
terrorism insurance was enacted under a similar logic.100 Unlike the stop-gap case, where 
temporary legislation is merely a placeholder for a more appropriate and deliberate 
permanent legislative response, this latter use of temporary legislation constitutes an ultimate 
legislative judgment about the proper policy. Such legislation is crafted in a temporary form 
so that the structure of the policy response aligns symmetrically with the structure of the 
policy problem. 
The third technocratic use of temporary law is experimental or information producing 
legislation. Recall that in policy environments dominated by uncertainty, temporary 
legislation generally produces lower error costs than permanent legislation. Experimental 
temporary legislation tends to implement policy on a short-term basis as a means of 
generating information that can be subsequently incorporated into the policy-making 
process. For example, in New York, temporary legislation was used to create an 
experimental policy allowing cameras in courtrooms.101 Although promising, this specific use 
of temporary legislation is also subject to several criticisms. First, as noted above, the mere 
availability of superior information does not ensure the information will be utilized by 
policy-makers. Even extremely useful information produced may still be information largely 
ignored. Second, in contexts where legislation is intended to gather information about 
private responses to the legislation itself, private actors may treat temporary legislation 
differently than permanent legislation, thereby undermining the policy experiment. Thus, the 
background presumption that temporary legislation is superior on informational grounds 
requires several caveats. 
First, the mere fact that a superior information set is available in the second stage of 
legislative action does not necessarily imply that better information will be used in the policy 
process.102 As a result, one critical empirical question is whether temporary statutes result in 
meaningful reconsideration in successive stages of reauthorization or simply get extended 
                                                     
97 See Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of  Tax Regulations, 44 TAX LAW 343, 343-44 (1991).  
98 See, e.g., Cinema '84 v C.I.R., 294 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The fact that a Treasury regulation is 
`temporary' does not diminish its legal effect.”); E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v C.I.R., 78 F.3d 795, 798 (2d 
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satisfying notice and comment requirements). For a general discussion of  this issue in the tax context, see 
Asimow, 44 TAX LAW at 343-44 (discussing increased reliance on temporary regulations by the Treasury 
Department starting in the 1980's).  
99 See Theodore Saloutos, New Deal Agricultural Policy: An Evaluation, 61 J. AM. HIST. 394, 403, (1974) (discussing 
view that Agricultural Adjustment Act was temporary legislation to deal with temporary market conditions).  
100 See section __ for an extended discussion.  
101 Jay C. Carlisle, An Open Courtroom: Should Cameras Be Permitted in New York State Courts?, 18 PACE L. REV. 297, 
298 (1998) (use of  temporary legislation for experimental period examining use of  cameras in courtrooms in 
New York).  
102 See section __.  
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with little or no deliberation. If temporary statutes are always extended with little 
deliberation, or virtually never extended, then the theoretical informational benefits are 
unlikely either to explain or justify the use of temporary legislation. Lacking a comprehensive 
empirical study of temporary and permanent legislation, I note simply that the anecdotal 
evidence indicates neither extreme position is tenable. Temporary legislation is sometimes 
repealed prior to the natural sunset, sometimes allowed to sunset without extension, 
sometimes extended with little legislative process, sometimes extended with significant 
committee and floor activity, and sometimes amended to be permanent legislation.103 At 
present, the most that can be said is that the nature and quality of second-stage legislative 
deliberations seem to vary significantly not only across statutes, but also over time for a 
given statute. 
Just by way of illustration, consider a handful of policy contexts. First, a growing list of 
tax benefits are enacted for short-term time periods.104 The extenders are “tax provisions 
that expire, forcing Congressional reconsideration every few years.”105 Legislative treatment 
of temporary tax provisions varies widely.106 For example, despite the development of 
extensive evidence that the targeted job tax credit had little or no influence on employer 
hiring, the credit was extended and ultimately made permanent.107 Better quality information 
in the subsequent stage of legislative decision-making was largely ignored or---equally likely--
-trumped by political considerations. On the other hand, the temporary tax example rebuts 
the assertion that Congress simply rubber stamps renewals without meaningful legislative 
deliberation. For example, Congress refused to extend the exclusion for employer-provided 
group legal services, which expired in 1992, but made permanent the low-income tax 
housing credit.108 Neither automatic renewal nor automatic termination of temporary 
legislation appears to be the norm.109 
Second, many environmental statutes are subject to periodic reauthorization and 
therefore, are essentially temporary legislation. For example, appropriations for the 
Endangered Species Act are generally allocated only a few years at a time, and the 
appropriations and reauthorizations often contain a mix of minimal, modest, and extensive 
amendments.110 The historical evidence on reauthorization proceedings in such areas is 
entirely mixed. Sometimes reauthorization involves extensive changes, as evidenced in the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.111 Other legislative programs are 
reauthorized with nothing more than a change in the date of program termination.112 
                                                     
103 Future empirical work might examine whether the statutory outcomes and legislative process of  temporary 
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105 Garrett, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. at 567.  
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Id at 562.  
109 Some temporary tax provisions might reasonably be termed experimental or information-producing. See 
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Additionally, note that all discretionary spending, approximately one-third of the Federal 
budget is subject to annual appropriations and thus is functionally similar to temporary 
legislation. No doubt some of these temporary measures receive little sustained attention on 
an annual basis, but others are obviously fiercely contested. This dynamic is only exacerbated 
by budget rules that require set-offs for new spending programs, further highlighting the 
importance of congressional rules and procedures for analyzing temporary legislation.113 
Finally, Congress recently considered bills that seek to alter the USA Patriot Act, which 
as enacted terminates many of its provisions at the end of 2005.114 The Security and Freedom 
Ensured (SAFE) Act of 2003 would have altered some of the more contentious provisions 
of the USA Patriot Act.115 However, other proposals would have made temporary portions 
of the USA Patriot Act permanent.116 One might favor either of these positions on 
ideological grounds, but the example provides no evidence that important legislation will be 
either renewed or terminated without significant legislative consideration. The simple point 
is that Congress does not systematically rubber stamp sunsetting legislation for 
reauthorization, nor does Congress automatically integrate new information into the policy 
process in a purely technocratic manner. Sunsetting statutes sometimes receive little 
legislative attention, but they sometimes receive consideration that is every bit as intense as 
deliberation on permanent legislation.117 
A second challenge to the informational/experimental rationale applies only to a subset 
of temporary legislation that is specifically designed to elicit information about how private 
parties would respond to the specific piece of legislation if it were permanent. Unlike research 
into a specific scientific problem, for which time and resources alone should be adequate to 
produce better information, some statutes seek to elicit information about how private 
parties would behave under a new legislative regime. Unfortunately, in order for information 
to be accurate, private parties must respond to the temporary legislation as though it is 
permanent, ignoring the legislation's temporary nature. In at least two contexts this 
assumption is probably unrealistic. First, if the legislation provides a benefit, private actors 
may over-respond to the legislation and try to derive all potential benefits prior to the sunset. 
For example, a temporary tax benefit---e.g. the temporary suspension of the capital gains 
tax---could compress behavioral changes into the temporary time period. As a result, the 
observed level of behavioral adjustment would be an inaccurate indicator of how private 
parties would respond to permanent legislation. Similarly, private parties might be under-
responsive to temporary legislation if the legislation requires costly changes to behavior and 
parties perceive that the legislation is unlikely to be extended after the sunset. Thus, both 
over- and under-responsiveness may bias the information that temporary legislation 
produces. The irony of course is that legislation will be extended precisely when it should 
not be (when the observed level of behavioral response is overstated), and terminated 
precisely when it should be extended (when the observed level of behavioral response is 
                                                                                                                                                              
Environmental Liability Act (CERCLA) generally produces significant program reform, but sometimes 
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113 See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structure of  Decision-Making in the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. LEG. 
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understated). As a result, temporary legislation will likely fare better as an information 
producing tool when the measure itself does not directly affect private incentives for 
behavioral change but rather simply allows external information like scientific research to 
develop during the interim time period. 
Overall, the informational benefits of temporary legislation's staged decision procedures 
turn on the presence and nature of uncertainty in the policy process. When initial uncertainty 
is high, staged procedures allow new information to be integrated into the policy process. In 
such contexts, temporary legislation will generally be superior to permanent legislation along 
the informational dimension. When cognitive bias is present, temporary legislation provides 
a compensation mechanism to allow certain forms of bias to diminish. And, when the 
information environment is dominated by asymmetries and the interaction between 
legislators and private interests would otherwise be discrete, temporary legislation creates 
stronger incentives for the accurate revelation of information than otherwise equivalent 
permanent legislation. In practice, temporary legislation is used for a range of technocratic 
ends, most of which turn on the role of information in the policy process. Temporary 
legislation is no magic bullet for informational challenges in the legislature. But, in practice, 
the theoretical benefits of temporary legislation appear to be real and potentially significant, 
particularly in the context of legislation addressing new risk. 
 
C. Politics and Public Choice 
 Beyond the differential effects of temporary and permanent legislation on transaction 
costs and information in the policy process, the two legislative forms also have important 
implications for the allocation of political power, costs, and risk, both within Congress over 
time and across branches of government. Although information may be one reason to rely 
on temporary legislation, politics is likely to be the dominant one. Thus, a normative 
evaluation of temporary legislation requires focusing on the political implications of 
temporary legislation. First, temporary legislation affects the power of agenda control--
shifting some degree of control from a future legislature to the current period majority. 
Second, temporary legislation increases the risk of legislative drift as a threat to the current 
period majority's policies. Third, temporary legislation allocates greater power to Congress 
relative to administrative agencies, thereby reducing the risk of bureaucratic drift as a threat 
to the current majority's policies. Lastly, both the intra-branch and inter-branch effects of 
temporary legislation depend on background institutional and political conditions. 
Before turning directly to these issues, I want to address a portion of the public choice 
literature that focuses on the “durability” of legislation.118 This strain of literature assumes 
that regulation or legislation is a good demanded by private interests and supplied by 
legislators for a negotiated price.119 Within this framework, parties to the agreement 
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(legislators and private interests) face serious challenges related to the non-simultaneity of 
performance.120 That is, “even after an interest group has succeeded in achieving enactment 
of a particular statute, there can be no promise that future legislators will not renege on the 
previously agreed upon legislative deal.”121 If Congress is unable to guarantee that legislative 
deals will be durable, Congress's ability to bargain effectively with private interests will be 
undermined. A variety of legislative mechanisms support the durability of legislative deals. 
For example, Landes and Posner argued that an independent judiciary facilitates the 
credibility of durable legislative bargains.122 High costs of producing legislation also decrease 
the probability that statutes will be repealed, and both the internal organization of Congress 
(committee structure and veto-gates) and delegation to administrative agencies can be 
understood as methods of insulating current period deals from future period legislatures, a 
point to which I return below.123 
Note that this literature either assumes or concludes that both private interests and 
legislators have a fairly straightforward preference for durable or long-term legislative 
bargains.124 However, this position suffers from two weaknesses, one theoretical and one 
empirical. The empirical weakness is that in practice, the duration of legislation exhibits 
widespread heterogeneity. A substantial body of legislation relies either on explicit sunsets, 
relatively frequent legislative reauthorizations, or short-term appropriations to fund 
regulatory regimes.125 While some portion of the literature argues that private or interest 
group legislation is more likely to be long-term than is public-interest legislation, many uses 
of short-term legislation---for example, the tax extenders---are hard to explain in this 
framework.126 The theoretical weakness is that there is no reason to think that either 
legislators or private interests should exhibit a clear preference for long-term legislation. 
Private interests recognize that current period deals may be undone by future legislative 
coalitions.127 Indeed, long-term bargains incorporate a greater risk of legislative defection. 
However, this risk of future repeal or policy adjustment will simply be incorporated into the 
price interests are willing to pay for legislation in the current period. If the deal is for credible 
long-term legislation, this value will rise. If the agreement is for a short-term measure, the 
value will fall. In either case, the private interest group will pay only a price that reflects the 
anticipated probability of future termination, nullification, or repeal.128 It is conceivable that 
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the costs of negotiating a series of short-term legislative packages are greater than the costs 
of negotiating a single long-term durable bargain, but that conclusion is not at all obvious, as 
the discussion of transaction costs demonstrated. The former will involve multiple periods 
of organizing and negotiating, but also lower per-period prices for legislation. No doubt 
there is a minimum benefit that an interest must receive in order to incur the transaction 
costs of organizing and negotiating a bargain. However, above this floor, the likely durability 
of the legislation will simply be incorporated into the current period price.129 This is not to 
say that specific interests will not prefer short- or long-term legislation. But, there should be 
no global preference across groups in favor of either permanent or temporary legislation. 
Moreover, because temporary legislation is frequently extended and permanent legislation is 
often amended and sometimes repealed, there is no necessary correlation between a 
temporary or permanent default rule and the actual duration of legislation. The temporary 
default produces many effects, but shorter duration is not obviously one of them. That said, 
the public choice literature correctly focuses attention on the risk to policies enacted by the 
current period majority and the interaction between the temporary legislative form and 
strategic dynamics within Congress over time and across branches of government. 
First, temporary legislation transfers the power of agenda control from the 
Congressional leadership in future Congresses to the current period legislature. Statutory 
expirations constrain the discretion of committee chairs by mandating that certain items be 
placed on the committee's agenda. For example, in 1992, approximately 56 percent of 
committee chairs faced significant agenda constraints because of sunsetting statutes.130 Given 
that one of the major benefits of committee chairmanship is agenda control, temporary 
legislation's effect is apparently quite significant. On the other hand, by ensuring that specific 
legislation will be reconsidered in the future, temporary legislation simultaneously allows 
future committee chairs to influence the substantive terms of the statute.131 Thus, within the 
legislature, temporary legislation entails an inter-temporal tradeoff between agenda control 
and legislative drift---the risk that future legislatures will change the substance of legislation. 
The second major political implication of using temporary rather than permanent 
legislation relates to inter-branch dynamics between Congress and the Executive. The choice 
of whether to delegate or produce policy using casework is often framed as a tradeoff 
between legislative drift and bureaucratic drift, and the choice between permanent and 
temporary legislation can be understood on largely the same terms.132 Delegation creates a 
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risk that the bureaucracy will alter policy (bureaucratic drift),133 while casework creates a risk 
that a future legislative coalition will alter policy (legislative drift). As noted above, future 
legislators may have different policy preferences than those of the current Congress, and 
therefore attempt to undo previous legislative outcomes. Traditionally, delegation to the 
bureaucracy has been understood as one potential mechanism for insulating policies from 
changes in the legislative tide. Whereas delegation gives greater power to administrative 
agencies relative to Congress, temporary legislation gives greater power to Congress as an 
institution relative to the bureaucracy. Indeed, this point was one of the core claims of the 
sunset legislation movement. Sunsetting authorizing statutes or agencies was supposed to 
increase Congressional control of the bureaucracy thereby increasing democratic 
responsiveness.134 As a result, a policy program enacted using temporary legislation is more 
susceptible to legislative drift, but less susceptible to bureaucratic drift than---for example---
delegation via permanent legislation. Thus, both delegation and temporary legislation can be 
understood as ways of compensating for different threats or political risks to enacted policy. 
However, both the intra-branch and the inter-branch effects of temporary legislation are 
heavily dependent on background institutional conditions. For example, just as decisions 
about delegation will be a function of the degree of difference between policy preferences of 
committee and floor medians, and between Congressional preferences and Executive 
preferences, so too will decisions about temporary legislation. For example, delegation is said 
to be more desirable when the median committee preference is further from the 
Congressional floor median than from the bureaucracy's ideal point because bureaucratic 
influence will move policies toward committee preferences, whereas casework would move 
policies toward the floor median.135 Temporary legislation is marginally less desirable in this 
context because it ensures that another round of legislation must get through a floor vote, 
which in turn moves the legislation back toward the floor median. As a result, less temporary 
legislation should be produced by “outlier committees.” Similarly, the degree of political 
stability will affect the relative desirability of temporary legislation. Within Congress, if 
majority coalitions are unstable, then temporary legislation is particularly risky. The sunset 
guarantees that the legislation will be reconsidered and because coalitions are unstable, the 
future period majority is likely to have preferences quite different from the current period 
majority. In this environment, political insulation should be preferred by those in control. 
The desirability of temporary legislation also depends on legislative time horizons. Any 
conditions that shorten legislative time horizons should increase the use of temporary 
legislation, all else equal. This is so not because temporary legislation produces a shorter 
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duration of legislation---the above discussion should have adequately dispensed with that 
claim. Rather, any institutional conditions that decrease the ability of legislators to 
“guarantee” long-term legislation will reduce the desirability of permanent legislation to 
private interests. Of course, as should be abundantly clear by now, legislators are virtually 
never in a position to guarantee permanent legislation over the long-term. Future legislatures 
can always amend or repeal legislation. Yet, as either political turnover increases, internal 
rules limit the role of seniority in Congress, or external constraints like term limits shorten 
time-horizons, the ability of legislators to protect legislation is diminished on the margin. 
Whereas ordinarily certain interests would prefer temporary legislation and others permanent 
legislation, as legislative time horizons decrease, a greater proportion of interests should 
favor temporary measures. For example, in the context of tax policy, Doernberg and 
McChesney argue that legislators have increasingly preferred short-term deals because of 
changes in legislative organization and an increase in the number of interest groups.136 As the 
effects of seniority on legislation diminished, it became more difficult for legislators to create 
stable long-term tax deals. Turnover on Congressional committees with jurisdiction over tax 
policy has increased in both houses, as has the frequency of short-term tax deals.137 Similarly, 
term limits shorten legislative time horizons and decrease the durability of legislation by 
increasing turnover, thereby reducing the value of long-term legislative bargains between 
interests and legislators.138 
External political conditions produce similar effects. For example, Professors Crain and 
Muris argue that divided government should produce short-term legislation because laws are 
less likely to survive beyond the current time period when bureaucrats from the other party 
can exert control over policy implementation.139 This is correct, but only partially so. It is 
true that divided government should produce more temporary legislation than united 
government, but not because bargains can only be enforced in the short-term. On the 
contrary, it is because temporary legislation allows Congress to exercise greater control over 
the policy in the long-term thereby mitigating the increased risk of bureaucratic drift 
associated with divided government. Nonetheless, whether government is united or divided, 
and how likely turnover is in the next election are important background variables that do 
affect the payoffs to legislators from utilizing temporary legislation. 
Related to many of these issues is the claim that short-term legislation produces a clear 
increase in welfare losses from rent-related activities.140 Yet, holding the substance of 
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legislation constant, a temporary measure actually produces less benefit to an interest than 
does otherwise equivalent permanent legislation. Temporary measures could produce less 
rent seeking in the aggregate because the prize for winning a statute is less valuable. On the 
other hand, if temporary legislation is generally cheaper for private interests to obtain, then 
smaller interest groups that would otherwise be unable to enter the pricey market for 
legislation may engage in rent-seeking for temporary legislation when they could not have 
entered the market for permanent legislation. Temporary legislation therefore produces 
greater competition in the market for legislation, which could---but will not necessarily---
produce net social welfare losses. Simultaneously, temporary legislation democratizes or at 
least increases diversity in the market for legislation. As a result, widespread use of 
temporary legislation could result in greater welfare losses, but not because rent-seeking 
increases near the sunset, or because there are two periods of legislative enactments, but 
because more interest groups are able to enter the market for legislation in the first place. To 
say the least, such back of the envelope calculations are highly speculative. Nonetheless, 
rent-seeking and rent-extraction by legislators are an important component of the temporary 
legislation puzzle.141 
In sum, temporary legislation produces a fairly wide range of political effects. Among 
these, temporary legislation transfers agenda control from the future to the current period 
legislature, makes it easier for future period legislatures to repeal or amend substantive 
legislation, thereby increasing the threat of legislative drift while decreasing the threat of 
bureaucratic drift, and advantages Congress relative to the bureaucracy. However, the 
relative desirability of temporary legislation is a function of internal institutional conditions 
within Congress, external institutional conditions in the Executive, and the degree of 
underlying political stability both within and outside the legislature. 
 
III. TEMPORARY LEGISLATION AND TERRORISM RISK 
 Having offered a basic characterization of temporary legislation and provided some 
initial analysis of its implications for politics and policy, I now turn to a more local 
exploration of temporary legislation in an applied context. To explore the dynamic of 
temporary legislation in practice, this section focuses on an admittedly non-traditional form 
of risk: domestic terrorism risk. This approach has several weaknesses, not the least of which 
is the fact that the topic is a controversial and justifiably emotional issue. Moreover, it 
remains to be seen whether terrorism risk is best understood as a unique form of risk or 
simply one type of a larger class of risks that are managed by government agencies. 
Nonetheless, the risk is perhaps the most recent example of a newly recognized risk, and one 
characterized by enormous uncertainty. As such, understanding the political response 
promises to help elucidate our understanding of other more traditional problems in the risk 
regulation literature. 
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA),142 was one of several responses to 
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the newly recognized risk of domestic terrorism in the United States. The USA Patriot Act 
and an initial airline-bailout package were two prominent others. TRIA produced a 
temporary backstop for insurance industry losses from domestic terrorism for a period of 
three years. Preliminary views on the wisdom of TRIA vary. A comparison of the 
legislation's stated purpose and the actual economic reality suggests TRIA may have been 
either unnecessary or unwise.143 On necessity grounds, by the time TRIA was enacted, the 
reinsurance market had already significantly recovered from the shock of September 11. On 
wisdom grounds, many of the articulated justifications for TRIA do not withstand close 
scrutiny.144 Nonetheless, the legislative response to terrorism risk illustrates many of the 
strengths and weaknesses of temporary legislation as a political strategy. Despite controversy 
over the substance of much of the terrorism risk legislation, the application provides a useful 
recent test case for temporary legislation. 
By any account, the losses suffered on September 11 were astounding. Even setting aside 
the devastating loss of life, in financial terms the event constituted the largest single loss-
event in U.S. insurance history. Early estimates put the insured losses at between $30-60 
billion.145 By way of comparison, Hurricane Andrew in 1992, one of the prior record holders 
for single-event insurance industry losses, yielded roughly $19 billion of insured losses. The 
Northridge Earthquake, the third largest insurance loss event caused roughly $12 billion in 
insured losses. Aggregate losses were significant, but at the individual firm level obligations 
from the event, net of reinsurance, varied widely. For example, Zurich Financial Services 
estimated their losses at between $700-900 million.146 Kemper estimated their pre-tax losses 
at $360 million gross and $60-80 million net of reinsurance.147 Despite the magnitude of the 
losses, the public stance of the insurance industry was a unified commitment to pay the 
losses from September 11, while urging future government innovation to help pay for future 
attacks. 
What concerned most insurers and reinsurers was the possibility of multiple catastrophic 
loss events within the same year. As one witness put it during a congressional hearing, “I 
remind the Committee that we are currently in Hurricane Season. If we fall prey to a 
catastrophic hurricane[,] another wave of terrorist acts, or any other calamitous event, 
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industry solvency could be called into question.”148 As a result, the industry suggested 
coverage for terrorism risk would likely be dropped or offered at significantly higher prices 
when existing obligations were re-written. The bottom line is that insured losses from 
September 11 were significant, but the industry was financially able and generally willing to 
meet existing obligations. 
Understanding the legislative response requires a quick overview of the distinction 
between insurance and reinsurance, and each market's relation to federal and state 
government.149 Primary insurance companies sell insurance directly to individuals or firms 
and are regulated almost exclusively by state government officers.150 Reinsurance companies 
essentially sell insurance to primary insurance companies, but is largely unregulated by either 
the federal or state governments.151 Because primary insurers rely heavily on reinsurance to 
function, if reinsurance is not available for a certain class of risk, primary insurers may be 
unwilling or unable to offer primary coverage to individuals or firms. 
This precise dynamic occurred in the Fall of 2001. First, reinsurers made clear that future 
policies, being issued when current policies expired either at the end of the year or in June of 
2002, would exclude terrorism risk.152 However, in order for the primary insurance industry 
to exclude terrorism risk from its coverage, regulatory approval from state insurance 
commissioners was required, which the industry quickly sought. The worst-case scenario for 
primary insurers was the loss of reinsurance for terrorism risk and the refusal of state 
regulators to approve either a rate increase or a terrorism exclusion. Ultimately, forty-five 
states approved temporary exclusions for terrorism risk on the recommendation of the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), which supported an exclusion 
until federal legislation was passed.153 However, both New York and California, two of the 
handful of states where terrorism risk was assumed to be highest, initially refused to approve 
an exclusion.154 The federal government ultimately enacted TRIA which shared excess risk 
between the insurance industry and the federal government. 
In early 2002, insurance that covered terrorism risk was difficult to find and quite 
expensive. While premiums for terrorism insurance skyrocketed and availability plummeted 
in Manhattan, many public venues in far less visible areas faced similar challenges. Tampa 
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International Airport spent $292,269 for a fifty million dollar policy.155 Gwinnett County 
Georgia paid more for terrorism insurance than for its entire property insurance bill in the 
previous year.156 The Mall of America in Minnesota had to obtain a temporary restraining 
order against its mortgage company who wanted to force the mall to obtain terrorism 
insurance, which was offered at almost triple the price of the mall's previous “all risk” 
policy.157 In New York, the challenges were severe, as they were for other so-called trophy 
properties.158 Even much less visible properties faced similar challenges. Property insurance 
for Ralph Wilson Stadium in Erie County jumped by $52,000 to $395,000.159 Utility 
companies had difficulty finding adequate coverage,160 and similar shortfalls were also 
experienced globally.161 Faced with growing customer frustration with capacity and the price 
of premiums, the insurance industry mobilized to lobby for federal intervention. The 
Coalition to Insure Against Terrorism publicized the importance of federal action on 
terrorism insurance.162 While there was disagreement within Congress about the proper 
scope of legislation, a broad consensus emerged that some form of federal response was 
justified. As one congressional aid speaking on the need for legislation put it, “[t]he sky may 
not have fallen but it's beginning to rain.”163 
The next eighteen months produced political battles about the terms of terrorism 
insurance legislation. The Bush administration sought to frame the terrorism insurance issue 
in macroeconomic terms, arguing that the lack of reinsurance for terrorism risk would slow 
or stop the economy. Federal intervention was needed not to bail out the insurance industry, 
but to protect the long-term health of America's economy.164 However, terrorism insurance 
                                                     
155 Ted Jackovics, TIA Buys Terrorism Insurance, TAMPA TRIB. 1 (Dec. 7, 2001). Yet, this is an ambiguous 
observation. On the one hand, the airport was able to obtain coverage just two months after the attacks. On 
the other hand, the airport hardly paid a bargain price.  
156 The county purchased $50 million of  coverage for just under $400,000 from Factory Mutual Insurance 
Company. See Doug Nurse, Terrorism Insurance Price Tag: $390,000, ATLANTA J. AND CONST. 1JJ (Jan. 1, 2002).  
157 Dee DePass, Megamall Battles Terrorism Insurance, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN) 1D (Mar. 1, 2002). The 
Simon Property Group, owner of  the mall, later settled with its mortgage company purchasing a $100 million 
policy. See Robert Harley, Mall Giant Buys $375m Terrorism Insurance Policy, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REV. 62 
(April 2, 2002).  
158 See Peter Grant, Lack of  Terrorism Insurance Snarls Deal, WALL ST. J. B2 (Jan. 31, 2002) (discussing difficulty of  
obtaining terrorism insurance on a property adjacent to Grand Central Terminal).  
159 Patrick Lakamp, Terrorism Insurance Cost Skyrockets After 9/11, BUFFALO NEWS A1 (May 21, 2002).  
160 Jackie Spinner, Lack of  Terrorism Insurance Puts Utilities at Risk, WASH. POST. E1 (Aug. 1, 2002) (quoting a 
representative of  the Potomac Electric Power Co.: “The market is being unreasonable because it can be 
unreasonable.”).  
161 Australia experienced the same early capacity problems for public venues. See Michael Owen-Brown, 
Companies Withdraw Terrorism Insurance, COURIER MAIL 3 (Dec. 19, 2001); Samantha Maiden, Terrorism 
Insurance Protection Set to Go, Advertiser 13 (Dec. 29, 2001). The Insurance Council of  Australia proposed a 
pool coverage system in which insurers would contribute a percentage of  premiums to a pool which the 
government would guarantee after claims reached a $1 billion limit. See Costello To Act Over Terrorism Insurance, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD 5 (Dec. 21, 2001). Approximately forty percent of  Australian companies had 
terrorism coverage excluded when policies were renewed. See Richard Salmomns, September 11 Takes Its Toll on 
Terrorism Insurance Cover, THE AGE (Melbourne) 2 (April 10, 2002).  
162 The coalition's membership was diverse, ranging from the American Banker's Association, to the National 
Association of  Homebuilders, to the National Collegiate Athletic Association, to the Real Estate Roundtable. 
See http://insureagainstterrorism.org.  
163 Nick Anderson, Terrorism Insurance Bill Revived, LA TIMES 9 (Aug. 19, 2002).  
164 See Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on Terrorism Insurance, 2001 WL 1219090 *1 
(White House) (Oct. 15, 2001): 
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legislation did not sail smoothly through Congress, taking more than a year to reach the 
President's desk. The House passed terrorism insurance legislation (HR 3210) at the end of 
November, 2001 by a vote of 227-193.165 But, the scene in the Senate was chaotic as 
legislators raced to pass legislation before the pending December 31 policy renewal 
deadline.166 The Senate recessed without passing legislation, thanks in large part to political 
wrangling over tort reform.167 
The new year brought high profile stories of exorbitant prices for terrorism risk coverage 
along with capacity shortfalls. While more than a dozen firms were offering terrorism 
insurance by April 2002 at rates significantly less than those offered earlier in the year,168 the 
Spring brought new momentum in the Senate for a legislative package,169 along with more 
political maneuvering.170 Ultimately, the Senate passed legislation in mid-June.171 The summer 
                                                                                                                                                              
One of  the things that we have seen that has happened since September 11th is that major reinsurers are no 
longer providing insurance against terrorist acts for property and casualty insurance. This is a problem because 
most of  these policies expire on 12/31 of  this year and once the reinsurance policies expire, it will be difficult 
for the property and casualty primary insurers to provide coverage. Without coverage against terrorist acts, 
banks will not lend to new construction; it will be difficult to sell major projects such as new pipelines, new 
power plants, skyscrapers. 
This macroeconomic framing of  the terrorism insurance issue was echoed throughout industry commentary, in 
the media, and in Congress. Consider the following statement by a representative of  the National Association 
for Real Estate Investment Trusts: “The absence of  insurance will have a severe impact on our ability to buy, 
sell and refinance properties.” See Alison Beard, Government Urged to Act as Companies Look to Drop Terrorism 
Insurance: Property Insurers Seek Safety Net to Cover Any Potential Losses, FINANCIAL TIMES 26 (Oct. 16, 2001). Said 
the Chief  Executive of  American International Group Inc. (AIG), “This is not an insurance problem as much 
as an economic problem. It may slow down economic growth at a time when economic growth is vital.” See 
Scott Bernard Nelson, Terrorism Insurance Laws Called Critical, BOSTON GLOBE D2 (Jan. 11, 2002) (Maurice 
Greenberg at a gathering of  the Greater Boston Chamber of  Commerce).  
165 See Roll No. 464, in 147 Cong. Rec. H 8630 (Nov. 29, 2001); see also H.R. 3210, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 
29, 2001); H.R. Rep. No. 107-304. 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 28, 2001); H.R. Rep. No 107-300(I), Terrorism 
Risk Protection Act, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 19th, 2001); H.R. Rep No 107-300(II), Terrorism Risk Protection 
Act, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 19th, 2001).  
166 As one of  Senator Daschle's aides noted, “Everybody and their brother is dropping bills at this point, and 
everybody is trying to figure out what it means.” See Jackie Spinner, Senate Divides Further on Terrorism Insurance, 
WASH. POST. A4 (Dec. 1, 2001). Senator McCain's bill would have provided government loans to cover 80 
percent of  claims if  an individual company's losses exceeded $10 million or five percent of  gross premiums 
written. See S 1744, Terrorism Insurance Act, 107th Cong., 1st Sess, 147 Cong. Rec. S 12161 (Nov. 29, 2001). 
Senator Hollings proposed that insurers pool resources to pay the first $50 billion in claims after which the 
government would pay 90 percent of  claims. See S 1743, National Terrorism Reinsurance Fund Act, 107th Cong., 
1st Sess, 147 Cong. Rec. S 12161 (Nov. 29, 2001). The third major alternative was proposed by Senator Gramm 
and resembled the White House's initial proposal, requiring insurers to cover the first $10 billion in losses and 
requiring the government to pay 90 percent of  additional claims for two years with a decreasing share in the 
program's third year. See S 1751, Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of  2001, 107th Cong., 1st Sess, 147 Cong. Rec. S 
12247 (Nov. 30, 2001).  
167 See Flubbing Terrorism Insurance, HARTFORD COUR. A10 (Dec. 31, 2001).  
168 Terrorism Insurance, PLAIN DEALER B8 (April 11, 2002).  
169 Joseph B. Treaster, Senate Takes Up Terrorism Insurance Again, NY TIMES C1 (April 30, 2002) (quoting Senator 
Charles Schumer (D-NY) saying “Sentiment to pass a terrorism insurance bill is growing day by day among the 
members of  both parties.”). See also Michael Remez, Dodd Bill Takes Up Terrorism Insurance, HARTFORD COUR. 
E2 (June 8, 2002).  
170 In mid-June, lawmakers reached agreement to allow debate on a terrorism insurance bill co-sponsored by 
Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn) and Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY). See S 2600, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(June 7, 2002), in 148 Cong. Rec. S 5472 (June 13, 2002); see also Jackie Spinner, Senate Gets Ready to Debate 
Terrorism Insurance Measure, WASH. POST. E3 (June 13, 2002). The bill, S 2600, required the federal government to 
pay 90 percent of  claims from terrorist actions above $1 billion to a cap of  $90 billion. See S 2600, 107th Cong., 
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produced only negotiations until President Bush set a deadline for legislation of Friday, 
October 5,172 and Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings on prominent New 
York properties like Rockefeller Center because of inadequate terrorism insurance coverage 
on the property.173 Ultimately, the final version of TRIA passed the House on November 14, 
2002,174 was approved by the Senate 81-11,175 and was signed by the President on December 
16, 2002.176 The entire legislative process took approximately fifteen months, not exactly a 
rapid-fire legislative response, but neither was the legislation permanently derailed. As 
enacted, TRIA provides a federal backstop for insurance industry losses stemming from 
terrorist loss events, and incorporates a mix of mandatory and discretionary payback 
provisions. TRIA is explicitly temporary legislation, enacted with an initial three-year term. 
The need for and substance of terrorism insurance legislation has been debated 
elsewhere, and I have no interest in replicating that debate.177 Suffice it to say that at very 
                                                                                                                                                              
2d Sess. (June 7, 2002), in Cong. Rec. S 5472. See also Elaine S. Povich, Senate to Debate Bill on Terrorism Insurance, 
NEWSDAY A34 (June 13, 2002).  
171 See Vote No 157, in 148 Cong. Rec. at S 5669 (June 18, 2002).  
172 See Bush Sets Friday Deadline for Terrorism Insurance Bill, WASH. POST. A7 (Oct. 2, 2002); Stephen Labaton and 
Joseph B. Treaster, Threats and Responses: Bush Tells Congress to Move Quickly on Terrorism Insurance, NY TIMES A17 
(Oct. 2, 2002).  
173 See Dean Starkman, Moody's Downgrades Securities on Lack of  Terrorism Insurance, WALL ST. J. C14 (Sept. 30, 
2002). Fitch Ratings downgraded over $5 billion in commercial mortgage backed securities because of  
inadequate terrorism insurance in early October of  2002. See Sheila Muto, Plots and Ploys, WALL ST. J. B4 (Oct. 9, 
2002). Interestingly, Standard & Poor's did not change its ratings on any commercial real estate loans because 
of  a lack of  terrorism insurance. See Labaton and Treaster, Threats and Responses, WALL ST. J. at A17.  
174 The conference report passed by a voice vote. 148 Cong. Rec. H 8809.  
175 See Vote No 252, in 148 Cong. Rec. S11530 (Nov. 19, 2002).  
176 See 148 Cong. Rec. X 0, enacted as Pub. L. No 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (Nov. 26, 
2002).  
177 TRIA has met with skepticism for three reasons. First, there is at least room for disagreement about the 
magnitude of  the insurance capacity crisis. Major loss events in a segment of  the insurance industry often lead 
to tight markets, in which insurance availability is low and prices are high. After Hurricane Andrew, insurer 
insolvency was a major problem and ultimately resulted in the current regulatory regime for dealing with 
hurricane risk in Florida. Property insurance in high risk regions is administered through a hybrid public-private 
regulatory regime. After the Northridge Earthquake in California, many firms were either insolvent or 
threatened to stop offering insurance for earthquake risk. A similar hybrid entity emerged in California to 
manage the problems of  insuring natural disasters. Earthquake insurance can currently be purchased from the 
California Earthquake Authority at subsidized rates. However, short-term market response is a poor indicator 
of  equilibrium or long-term market response. Demand for insurance coverage increases, capital flows into the 
industry, and tight markets often do not last. See Gron and Sykes, 36 IND. L. REV. at 451-55. The insurance 
industry was well capitalized after September 11 and had adequate reserves to meet existing obligations. As of  
June 30, 2001, total capital and surplus of  the U.S. insurance and reinsurance industry was about $300 billion. 
The figures provide a rough indicator of  industry capacity to meet existing obligations. At first glance, the 
figures are reassuring since insured losses were far less than reserves. Yet, this reading is also somewhat 
misleading. These capital reserves were not earmarked for terrorism risk. Indeed, while terrorism risk was 
covered in most property insurance prior to September 11---that is to say, terrorism risk was not specifically 
excluded from policies---the risk was essentially estimated to be zero. No additional fees or premiums were 
charged for the coverage. While most companies had the ability to pay for insured losses, the losses were still 
non-trivial for most. Moreover, by the time TRIA was enacted private markets had already started to recover. 
Soon after September 11, one insurance analyst estimated that it was “close to a 100 percent probability that 
some reinsurer will fail and be unable to pay claims as a result of  this event.” See Terrorism Insurance: Bill Would 
Cushion Blow of  Future Attacks, COLUMBUS DISPATCH A10 (Dec. 8, 2001) (quoting Morgan Stanley analyst). 
However, by Spring 2002, at least one group argued that “[m]ore than 75 percent of  the largest corporations 
now have terrorism insurance.” See Joseph B. Treaster, Senate Takes Up Terrorism Insurance Again, NY TIMES C1 
(April 30, 2002) (quoting J. Robert Hunter, director of  insurance for the Consumer Federation of  America). 
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least, the need for Federal legislation was uncertain given the apparent recovery of the 
reinsurance market.178 Additionally, some commentary has suggested that TRIA raises 
potential problems of market displacement and moral hazard.179 
For current purposes, it is enough to note that TRIA constitutes one of the most recent 
examples of a temporary legislative response to new risk. Against the backdrop of significant 
uncertainty, both about the need for legislation, the level of background terrorism risk, and 
the ability of private markets to effectively manage such risk, TRIA adopted something of a 
“wait and see” strategy, enacting short-term policy, but also collecting more information 
before adopting widespread structural policies. To be clear, I am not claiming that this was 
the dominant or even a major motivation for the temporary form. I note simply that the 
temporary approach has potential informational advantages in this context. Rather than 
creating new agencies or adopting permanent regulatory regimes, temporary legislation 
seems to have allowed politicians to respond to public demands for action, while guarding 
against a potentially irrational overreaction to new information about a risk. The prescription 
to avoid permanently creating new agencies and programs in the face of widespread 
uncertainty may seem mundane. However, the history of risk regulation is dominated by the 
creation of permanent regulatory regimes that tend to prioritize lesser new risks at the 
expense of more serious older ones. 
In crafting a statutory response to terrorism risk and the related insurance crisis, 
legislators faced at least three classic problems of decision-making under risk and 
uncertainty. First, the best estimates of the probability of future terrorism in given regions or 
the likely magnitude of losses were extremely poor. Whether the estimates were high or low, 
there was tremendous variance around the probabilities. Indeed, this was part of the 
insurance industry's refrain: current information is inadequate to price terrorism insurance 
accurately. While TRIA does not guarantee that estimates of either the probability of attack 
or the magnitude of potential losses will be better in three years, the estimates will almost 
certainly not be worse. At very least, the full cost of the September 11 attacks will be 
estimated, and solidifying that data point will be useful for future decision-making. The 
historical experience with natural disaster risk provides some reason for modest optimism on 
                                                                                                                                                              
The Consumer Federation was the most consistent critic of  federal intervention throughout the legislative 
process. In July 2002, Warren Buffet reported to shareholders that Berkshire Hathaway was “selling more 
terrorism coverage than anybody but it does not endanger Berkshire Hathaway.” See Seizing the Day: Buffett Goes 
Where Few Will On Terrorism Insurance, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL. REV. 49 (July 13, 2002). Historically, Berkshire 
made significant profits by insuring catastrophic risk and in 2002 joined with Allianz and others to offer 
terrorism insurance to airlines. Berkshire also participated in Extremus, a new terrorism insurer in Germany. 
Berkshire wrote terrorism coverage for the Sears Tower in Chicago and for the World Cup Championship. See 
Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., How Big Is the Terrorism Insurance Problem?, WALL ST. J. A13 (Aug. 13, 2002).  
178 As one article put it, “So much for predictions that banks and real-estate investors would cease to function, 
abandon their careers, and head for the hills with a shotgun and 10 years' supply of  Campbell's soup.” See 
JENKINS, WALL ST. J. at A13 (Aug. 17, 2002).  
179 For helpful overviews and discussions, see Gron and Sykes, 26 IND. L. REV. at 262; Manns, 112 YALE L. J. at 
2519 ; Jeffrey R. Brown and Randall S. Kroszner and Brian H. Jenn, Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance, Unpublished 
Manuscript, NBER 9721 (2002). Because federal backstopping provides a cheap means for primary insurers to 
transfer risk, the demand for private reinsurance for terrorism risk should be depressed, lessening incentives for 
reinsurance firms to return to the terrorism insurance market. Conceivably, TRIA could prevent rather than 
facilitate the recovery of  the reinsurance market for terrorism risk. While most early commentary has been 
critical of  TRIA, Manns, 112 YALE L. J. at 2513-14, advocates a more positive reading of  the legislation by 
arguing that a backstop or federal reinsurance provides only indirect benefits to organized interests, limiting the 
effects of  rent-seeking.  
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this front. Especially in the past fifteen years, advances in computer modeling have allowed 
us to develop upper and lower bounds on damage estimates from different types of natural 
catastrophes. Adapting these models to the terrorism context is not a trivial task, but nor 
does it appear to be an insurmountable one. Even if the probability of future terrorism 
cannot be effectively estimated, better estimates of the likely magnitude of losses will help 
with pricing issues. The multi-stage decision process will allow legislators to adjust policy in 
response to new information. 
However, TRIA may fall into the trap of ignoring the potential for over- or under-
responsiveness by private actors to temporary legislation. For example, if insurance firms 
treat TRIA as temporary, and the information legislators need to craft permanent policy 
derives primarily from firm behavior, then the information produced may be largely 
inaccurate. On the other hand, experience with new financial instruments and better 
estimates of background risks may still produce useful information for policymakers. As a 
result, the staged procedure may well provide other informational benefits not tied directly 
to behavioral responses. 
TRIA provides a second reason for skepticism about the practical impact of temporary 
legislation. On the other hand, the time-line of legislative response might lead one to 
question whether legislators really have difficulty avoiding striking when the iron is hot. At 
first glance, the prescription seems poorly suited to the reality of domestic politics in the 
United States. As the Congressional testimony from TRIA underlines, industry 
representatives predicted an insurance crisis on January 1, 2002. While the House passed a 
terrorism insurance bill a month before this deadline, the Senate failed to act until the 
following Summer. Ultimately, TRIA was signed into law almost a year after the supposed 
start-date of the crisis. One article compared Congress to “paramedics who take a year to get 
to the scene of an accident.... The patient, meanwhile, long ago got up and limped away.”180 
On this view, existing institutions like bicameralism already provide adequate safeguards 
against any danger of an overzealous legislative response, and the inherent delay in the 
legislative process allows information to be incorporated just as I have argued that 
temporary legislation does. This criticism is plausible, but the rapid enactment of the USA 
Patriot Act---passed just six weeks after September 11---provides some countervailing 
evidence.181 The Patriot Act demonstrates that legislation clearly can be enacted with 
remarkable rapidity during times of perceived crisis. Those critical of the legislation may be 
tempted to condemn the temporary legislative form because it facilitated the enactment of 
undesirable legislation. However, there is no reason to think legislators are less capable of 
evaluating legislation with sunsets than legislation without. Nor is it the case that legislation 
with sunsets systematically produces outcomes that infringe on civil liberties or is generally 
                                                     
180 Jenkins, WALL ST. J. A13 (Aug. 14, 2002).  
181 Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 
Patriot Act) Act, Pub. L. 107-56 (H.R. 3162), 115 Stat. 272, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 26, 2001). The 
substantive provisions of  the legislation have proven extremely controversial; however, the Act also contained 
an explicit sunset clause. See Pub. L. 107-56 (H.R. 3162), § 224 (sunsetting approximately half  the powers in the 
statutes at the end of  December 31, 2005. Some have argued the sunset clause was a significant victory for civil 
rights advocates. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congress, Civil Liberties, and the War on Terrorism, 11 WM & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 1139, 1146-47(2003). The sunset provision may also increase Congressional power in the implementation of  
the Act. See id (arguing that the sunset and the Patriot Act's form constitute something akin to fire alarm 
oversight). See also Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 111 
YALE L. J. 1011, 1035-38 (2003) (discussing temporary responses to perceived emergencies or crises).  
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less normatively desirable than outcomes produced by statutes without sunsets.182 
Recall that staged decision-making is also supposed to improve incentives for accurate 
information revelation and compensate for the existence of asymmetric information. TRIA's 
enacting process suggests similar asymmetries may have existed, which a staged legislative 
process should have mitigated, but apparently did not. For example, throughout the 
Congressional hearings, industry representatives presented testimony that was at best 
incomplete and at worst misleading. Virtually all testimony argued that terrorism risk is a 
unique type of uninsurable risk. While other forms of catastrophic risk like natural disaster 
risk were said to be readily insurable by private markets, terrorism risk uniquely required 
federal backstopping.183 However, natural disaster risk has not been consistently insurable in 
                                                     
182 The Homeland Security Act of  2002 (HSA) provides an interesting reference point for both TRIA and the 
USA Patriot Act. See Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (Nov. 25, 2002), codified at 6 USCA 
§ 101-02, 111-13, 121-22, 131 (2003); 50 USCA 401(a) (2003). HSA reorganized much of  the federal 
bureaucracy under the aegis of  the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), a new agency charged with 
managing domestic security risks. The restructuring will surely have diverse effects. However, of  particular 
relevance to the catastrophic risk case is the relocation of  the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), a previously independent regulatory agency, to DHS. See HSA, § 430(c)(8). FEMA is the modern 
incarnation of  the Office of  Emergency Protection (OEP), which in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's was charged 
primarily with addressing catastrophic risk from nuclear attacks and secondarily with the non-security-related 
issues from natural disasters. Eventually, as natural disasters gained political prominence and mismanagement 
of  major natural disasters received media attention, the natural disaster and domestic security responsibilities 
were split. FEMA was created as part of  President Carter's bureaucratic reorganization plans in the late 1970's. 
See Reorganization Plan No 3 (1978) (administrative responsibilities transferred from a host of  other federal 
agencies pursuant to Executive Orders 12127 and 12148). For FEMA, the relocation to DHS is a return home 
of  sorts to its domestic security roots. While it is still too early to discern the full effects of  the relocation, a 
few observations are worth highlighting. First, OEP's domestic security responsibilities were split from 
FEMA's natural disaster responsibilities for a reason. The emphasis on domestic security, while obviously 
critical, is a poor context for devising more general policies for managing catastrophic risk. Moreover, while 
there may be significant overlap in the types of  disaster-response issues encountered in terrorist attacks and 
natural disasters, the sets are not coterminous. Challenges outside the overlapping set are likely to be pushed 
down the political agenda within DHS. On the one hand, the political reaction to terrorism risk was similar to 
reactions to other new risks. Major policy reforms often follow significant events. In the catastrophe context, 
see THOMAS A. BIRKLAND, AFTER DISASTER: AGENDA SETTING, PUBLIC POLICY, AND FOCUSING EVENTS 
(Georgetown 1997). The important difference is that HSA's response is institutional and this structural 
response was almost certainly not driven by public pressure. It seems clear citizens wanted some form of  
political action, but it is much less obvious that ordinary citizens had any opinion about restructuring the 
bureaucracy. On the other hand, advocates for the reform of  risk regulation often argue for creating a single 
oversight agency that can compare relative risks and benefits across different policy arenas to ensure that the 
most lives, life-years, or quality-adjusted-life-years are saved by a given level of  expenditures. See SUNSTEIN, 
RISK AND REASON; STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION (1993) (advocating super-regulatory agency to manage tradeoffs in risks across different 
regulatory regimes and administrative agencies). Justice Breyer's proposal for a super-regulatory agency might 
actually be inadvertently realized in new agency, albeit in a limited policy area. While, my own intuition is that 
DHS's primary mission will lead it too far afield to effectively rationalize risk regulation, it is important to 
recognize the potential benefits. Again, it is simply too soon to discern the long term effects of  the structural 
change. Nonetheless, a real, if  tentative concern is that FEMA's move will result in less effective management 
of  non-terrorism related catastrophic risks.  
183 This same dynamic was mimicked in the popular press. One article noted “[u]nderwriters have hundreds of  
years of  data available on earthquakes and hurricanes, but the magnitude of  losses for Sept. 11 were beyond 
anyone's frame of  reference. This is something that is brand new. No one knows how to charge for the 
coverage or how to predict the next event.” See Joseph Bonney, Risky Business: Ports and Terminal Operators Want 
Government Action to Provide Terrorism Insurance, J. Commerce 30 (June 10, 2002). A vice-president for the 
American Insurance Association noted that insurance companies can decide how much to charge for 
homeowners' policies in hurricane-prone areas, for example, because they have 100 years of  hurricane data to 
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the United States without the assistance of federal or state government at any point in the 
past fifty years.184 Natural disaster risk has hardly been an easy case for private markets.185 In 
reality, terrorism risk was just the latest in a series of attempts to obtain federal backstopping 
for losses from catastrophic risk. In legislation introduced in the 104th, 105th, and 106th 
Congresses, insurance interests advocated a similar federal backstop program for natural 
disaster risk.186 Even in the 1980's, a coalition of approximately 300 insurance firms known 
as the “Earthquake Project” was formed specifically to lobby for federal backstopping of 
industry losses from natural disasters.187 The request for federal backstopping of terrorism 
                                                                                                                                                              
help asSess. the risk. See Povich, Terrorism Insurance at Impasse, NEWSDAY A15 (July 4, 2002); see also Jackie 
Spinner, Putting A Price on `What If' Actuaries Lack Figures to Fix Premiums for Terrorism Insurance, WASH. POST. E1 
(Oct. 24, 2001) (“Although no one forecast the hurricane or the earthquake, they were, in a sense, predictable. 
Scientists know that hurricanes and earthquakes happen because they have happened.”). Senator Christopher J. 
Dodd (D-Conn) summarized the dominant position:  
Insurance companies insure only those risks that are predictable and quantifiable. Although insurers are in 
the business of  protecting people against future hazards --- such as fires and hurricanes --- those hazards 
are predictable, at least statistically. Terrorism is not. And what the insurance industry cannot predict, it 
cannot insure. To ask insurers to insure against unpredictable risks would be to ask them to stop being 
businesses and instead become gamblers. 
Christopher J. Dodd, Underwrite Terrorism Insurance, HARTFORD COUR. C3 (Nov. 25, 2001).  
184 For helpful discussions of  the history of  insurance for natural hazards, see DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE 
FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER (2002); THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHIC RISK 
(Kenneth A. Froot, ed.) (Chicago 1999); KUNREUTHER AND ROTH, PAYING THE PRICE; Howard Kunreuther & 
Paul K. Freeman, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK THROUGH INSURANCE (Kluwer 1997); KUNREUTHER, 
DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION.  
185 Flood insurance in the United States is provided only because of  the National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP), a federal program originally instituted in 1968. See generally, Edward T. Pasterick, The National Flood 
Insurance Program, in PAYING THE PRICE (Kunreuther & Roth, eds.) (discussing history and function of  NFIP). 
Individual insurance companies are authorized to write flood insurance policies, but the prices are subsidized at 
a rate of  approximately fifty percent by the federal government. Earthquake risk has proven no easier for 
private markets. Setting aside the persistent unwillingness of  individuals in hazard prone regions to maintain 
adequate coverage, major quakes have consistently sent firms fleeing the market. The Northridge quake caused 
over $12 billion in federal disaster expenditures and $12.5 billion in insured losses, a figure three times larger 
than what insurers had received in premiums during the preceding twenty-five years. See David A. Moss, 
Courting Disaster? The Transformation of  Federal Disaster Policy since 1803, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHIC 
RISK (Froot, ed ) (discussing history of  federal natural disaster policy). Following the earthquake, many 
insurance firms refused to write new coverage and a hybrid public-private entity was formed to write 
earthquake insurance. See generally Peter May, Addressing Public Risks: Federal Earthquake Policy Design, 10 J. POL'Y 
ANAL. & MAN. 263 (1991); see also Ali Asgary and K.G. Willis, Household Behavior in Response to Earthquake Risk: 
an Assessment of  Alternative Theories, 21 DISASTERS 354 (1997) (discussing citizen response and perception of  
earthquake risk). The situation is remarkably similar in Florida, where Hurricane Andrew in 1992 forced many 
companies into insolvency and sent many others fleeing the market. See Insurance Research Council, Coastal 
Exposure and Community Protection: Hurricane Andrew's Legacy (IRC 1994) (discussing aftermath of  
Hurricane Andrew for property insurance in the South Atlantic region); see also THE BIG ONE: HURRICANE 
ANDREW (Roman Lyskowski & Steve Rice, eds.) (Andrews McMeel 1992). There are many reasons for the 
current state of  affairs in the market for natural disaster insurance, all of  which are beyond the scope of  this 
paper. My point is simply that invoking natural disaster risk as an example of  an easily insurable catastrophic 
borders on perverse.  
186 See the legislative history of  H.R. 21, The Homeowners' Insurance Availability Act of  2002, 106th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (Jan. 6, 1999) which in its previous form in the 105th Congress was H.R. 219, and part of  a more 
comprehensive legislative reform effort in the 104th Congress. See H Rep 106-526, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 
15, 2000).  
187 See Dick Kirschten, Hyping the Big Quake, 22 NATL J. 11 (1990) (discussing formation and effort of  the 
Earthquake Project). As part of  the effort, the coalition engaged the services of  David A. Jewell and Associates 
Inc., a Washington D.C. public relations firm, the Seattle law firm of  Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellison & Holman 
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risk was not novel, but rather just the latest in a series of lobbying efforts.188 
All this is something of an embarrassment for one portion of the theory. TRIA's staged 
decision-process should have guarded against such misrepresentation, by ensuring repeated 
interaction among the main players. On the one hand, the temporary form did little to 
induce honest information revelation. On the other hand, the interim time period may allow 
some subset of private claims to be filtered during the temporary legislative period. Rather 
than allowing plausible but inaccurate claims to justify widespread policy reforms, the 
temporary form at least allows more information to be collected. For example, despite dire 
predictions about long-term capacity issues, many scholars think the market is likely to 
provide a relatively robust response to a high demand for insurance.189 Overall, the case 
study suggests a somewhat mixed review of temporary legislation's performance. The 
temporary legislation approach adopted in both TRIA and the USA Patriot Act seems 
appropriate in the context of significant uncertainty. However, many of the potential 
benefits also appear to have gone largely unrealized. The case does however highlight the 
reality that temporary legislation often receives extensive consideration during the initial 
enacting period, and also receives substantial deliberation in future time periods as well. The 
previous Congress considered a range of different renewal bills, some of which would simply 
extend TRIA for another two or three years and others of which would offer more 
substantive amendments,190 before finally taking a relatively moderate path by renewing the 
insurance program, but with somewhat higher triggers and another sunset. All of which 
should undermine any lingering concerns that temporary legislation is democratically suspect 
because future legislatures give scant attention to expiring statutes. 
                                                                                                                                                              
to devise and implement a legislative strategy; and former Rep. Lloyd Meeds (D-Wash, 1965-79) to direct the 
lobbying effort.  
188 To be fair, there has been historical disagreement within the insurance industry about the wisdom of  a 
federal backstop for natural disaster risk. One can excerpt portions of  testimony by witnesses to create a 
caricature of  the insurance industry, but that is neither necessary nor productive. Still, the evaluation of  TRIA--
-both in the specific applied context of  terrorism risk and as a more general institutional response to new risk--
-should be based on an accurate rather than fictitious account of  the historical experience managing 
catastrophic risk.  
189 See generally Gron & Sykes, 36 IND. L. REV. at 457.  
190 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Backstop Extension Act of  2004, H.R. 4634, 108th Cong., 2d Sess, (June 22, 
2004); Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Extension Act of  2004, H.R. 4772, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 7, 
2004); A Bill to Extend the applicability of  the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of  2002, S2764, 108th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (July 22, 2002).  
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Conclusion 
This Article has attempted to show that temporary legislation is ubiquitous in both 
modern and historical legislatures. As a historical matter, temporary legislation has been 
readily accepted and extensively utilized by legislators, but all but ignored by legal scholars. I 
have suggested that use and misuse of temporary legislation is best traced to the strategic 
effects of temporary measures; some normative attractive for democracy, others much less 
so. Recent legislative responses to new risk illustrate many of the relevant costs and benefits 
using temporary and permanent law in practice. Locally, in the context of new risk 
legislation, I conclude that temporary legislation's advantages outweigh its drawbacks. 
However, the normative status of temporary legislation in other areas will be a function of 
underlying political conditions and policy concerns. Still, temporary legislation is a critical 
and heretofore poorly understood method of lawmaking. While work remains, this Article 
constitutes a first step in the conceptual foundation and empirical effects of temporary 
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